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We study how informal buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive
industry affect procurement. Using unique data from a survey focusing on these,
we show that more trust, the belief that the trading partner acts to maintain
the mutual relationship, is associated with both higher quality of the automotive
parts and more competition among suppliers. Yet both effects hold only for parts
involving unsophisticated technology, not when technology is sophisticated. We ra-
tionalize these findings within a relational contracting model that critically focuses
on changes in the bargaining power, due to differences in the costs of switching
suppliers.
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1 Introduction
Relational contracts, informal agreements sustained by the value assigned to future
interactions, are a key feature of business relationships. They complement formal con-
tracts, and in certain cases can be considered a substitute to integration that plays an
increasingly important role in many economies.1 A recent example of such a business
relationship has led to a crucial medical breakthrough: After successfully cooperating
previously for two years, BioNTech and and Pfizer worked together for twelve months
sharing valuable intellectual property, before even signing a formal contract to develop
one of the first vaccines against the Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2.2
Informal relationships are particularly relevant in the German automotive industry.
Independent upstream suppliers exploit economies of scale by producing parts for multi-
ple downstream firms, while carrying out cutting-edge research and development whose
results are embedded in – often buyer-specific – parts.3 The key players in the industry,
who include the world’s largest part suppliers and some of the leading buyers, have been
operating as vertically separate units since at least WWII, so their relationships have
lasted for decades without any major interruption. To be successful, these long term re-
lationships require each party to trust that their partner will not exploit the relationship
to increase its short-term profits.
We analyze in this paper the consequences of a serious shock to the procurement re-
lationships in the German automotive sector. In the early 1990s Ignacio Lopez, then in
charge of procurement at GM, and his entire team were poached by German carmaker
VW. Their mission was to implement the highly aggressive, cost-saving procurement
practices that Lopez had been (in)famous for at GM, with dramatic consequences on
the buyer-supplier relationship (see Helper and Henderson, 2014). In the German auto-
motive industry, these practices threatened the entire innovation-driven business model
of upstream suppliers. Until then, suppliers had willingly shared results of their expen-
sive R&D efforts embedded in their blueprints for innovative parts with buyers, while
competing for procurement contracts. This willingness was based on the expectation
that their substantial efforts would be compensated at least in part through being cho-
sen for production. An essential feature of Lopez’s strategy was to use these blueprints
without compensation for open procurement, pushing prices toward marginal costs and
thereby expropriating the supplier’s intellectual property.4
1See Gibbons and Henderson (2013) for a survey on the empirical evidence.
2Based on BioNTech founder Uğur Şahin’s keynote address at the 2021 conference Relational Con-
tracts: Theory and Practice. The importance of trust-based relationships was further stressed by
high-level participants from firms including Boeing, GM, Kraft Foods, Procter & Gamble and Rolls
Royce.
3See Müller et al. (2016). German automotive suppliers tend to be more research oriented than in
the U.S. and Japan, where research is mainly carried out by the buyers. For instance, Koppel et al.
(2018) report that in 2015, the two largest German suppliers filed about as many patent applications
as the five most research intensive automotive producers.
4See Moffett and Youngdahl (1999) for a detailed description of Lopez’s procurement strategy. For
a discussion of Lopez’s long shadow over Opel, a German daughter company of GM, see here while a
collection of articles on Lopez’s case is found here.
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The drastic change in procurement practice led to a substantial increase in VW’s
short run profits. Moreover, Lopez’ strategy was adopted – to varying degrees – by VW’s
German competitors. The affected long-term supplier-buyer relationships underwent
dramatic transformation, threatening the underlying innovation-oriented model.
The long shadow of this disruption prompted the German Association of Car Manu-
facturers (VDA), whose board includes the CEOs of all German automotive producers
and the leading suppliers, to unanimously commit to a detailed and costly benchmark-
ing study in 2007 on the consequences of that disruption. At its heart was a survey
developed by a steering committee involving researchers as well as representatives of
the participating manufacturers and suppliers. Mostly identical questionnaires were ad-
dressed to both buyers and sellers, to capture the views from both sides. The survey
respondents were procurement experts on the buyer side, and specialists in the areas of
development, production, and sales on the supplier side.5 The joint effort resulted in
one of the largest and most detailed surveys to date of buyer-supplier relationships in
an industry that provides complex final products.
The survey was designed primarily to identify distortions of the informal long-term
relationships, and secondly to identify violations of legally enforceable contracts. The
documentation of these distortions renders our data unique in capturing relational con-
tracting issues. That these disturbances prompted the national industry association
to initiate this major study underscores their importance for the entire industry. The
survey was conducted between Fall 2007 and Summer 2008, more than ten years after
Lopez was removed from VW. The relationships between buyers and suppliers reflected
therein extend backwards well beyond that critical episode.6
In our empirical, and an ensuing theoretical analysis rationalizing our empirical re-
sults, we focus on two aspects important to understanding relational contracting within
high tech industries: How differences in mutual trust affect the suppliers’ investment into
the development of buyer-specific parts; and how differences in trust affect the number
of suppliers the buyer selects to compete in development and production. Trust between
suppliers and buyers was the central and policy relevant topic of this unique survey. The
notion of mutual trust measured in it was developed in intensive discussions within a
steering committee consisting of chief procurement and sales executives nominated by
the members of the VDA board.
Empirically, we find first that, not unexpectedly, higher mutual trust between a
supplier and a buyer is associated with a lower incidence of quality problems, indicating
higher (unobservable) buyer- and part-specific investment. The observed association is
5The survey contained 335 questions. Its preparation and execution cost many precious workdays.
6The relationships reflected in the data had been in place for more than 15 years on average (the
question was censored at the top, so the actual average is higher). An indication for the importance of
relational aspects is that in our data the share of litigated violations of formal contracts is negligible,
below one percent. The Kiekert-Ford-Case exemplifies relational (instead of legal) punishment in the
industry: Kiekert, a specialized producer of car locks, claimed a serious issue in its process computing
facilities during contract negotiations with Ford. This stalled Ford assembly lines for weeks, until a
continuation contract favorable to Kiekert was signed. In response, Kiekert was excluded by Ford from
future contracts. Ford chose a relational form of punishment instead of pursuing damages in court. See
Wachtler (2002).
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significant only for low-tech parts involving low rather than high complexity, however.
We find second that higher trust is associated with more suppliers invited by the buyer to
compete in development, and more frequent co-sourcing of production of a given part.7
Again, this relationship between trust and competition is significant only for low-tech,
and not for high-tech parts.
It is generally challenging to establish causality on the basis of cross-sectional sur-
vey data. We use observations on past buyer behavior to instrument our measure of
trust. In particular, the buyer passing on suppliers’ intellectual property rights, which
is detrimental to trust, should not directly affect current part quality. The reported
results remain unchanged. These findings do not imply that trust is generally irrelevant
for procurement relationships involving high-tech parts. Indeed, the survey responses
indicate that trust is equally important in relationships involving each of the different
part categories.
We develop a theoretical model to explain these puzzling observed patterns. In our
model, outcomes depend not only on the beliefs of the contracting parties, but also on the
complexity of the procured parts and the associated costs of switching their production
to a different supplier. The level of these switching costs determines who of the two
parties has the bargaining power, and with it, influences their allocation decisions.
More specifically, a buyer repeatedly procures the development and production of a
part, including a blueprint requiring buyer-specific non-contractible investment.8 Sev-
eral suppliers are capable of this, but differ in production costs unknown to the buyer.
At the start of the development phase, the buyer invites a subset of these suppliers
to competitively invest in developing the blueprint, and formulates performance speci-
fications requiring the typical supplier’s non-contractible investment.9 The investment
cost is compensated by a contractible transfer payment from the buyer, together with
expected rents generated from eventual production. The buyer awards the production
contract using an efficient procedure.
Mutual bilateral trust between a buyer-supplier pair used in our empirical analysis
is modeled by using a common discount factor that reflects the parties’ valuation of the
continued relationship. The central comparative statics result is that an increase in the
discount factor allows the buyer to increase both the number of suppliers involved in the
development phase and the required investment. The relational contract ensures that
suppliers invest during the development phase despite increased competition; in return,
buyers limit outside competitors’ access to competing for the production contract. In
particular, the relational contract would break down if, as in Lopez’s strategy, the buyer
would deviate by opening up competition to suppliers that had not previously undertaken
relationship-specific development investment.
7By contrast, one could expect from theory and the existing empirical evidence (Calzolari and
Spagnolo, 2009; Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2021) that stronger competition between suppliers for
procurement contracts would be detrimental to the relationship with a given buyer.
8While the buyer-supplier relationships in general are very long-lasting, procurement for parts for
any given car model is repeated every 12-18 months in the course of model-updates.
9The engineers of both buyers and suppliers in the steering group unanimously agreed that it is
impossible in practice to assign supplier’s development investment to individual car models, due to the
large role of investment into basic research.
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Which of the parties reaps the additional benefits arising from higher trust depends
on the allocation of bargaining power, associated with the cost involved in taking the
winning blueprint and selecting a supplier from outside the original subset to produce
the part, which we refer to as “switching costs”.10 These costs are substantially smaller
for low-tech than more complex high-tech parts. For low switching costs, the bargaining
power rests with the buyer.11 An increase in mutual trust allows the buyer to increase
required investment and/or increase competition among suppliers in the development
process. For high switching costs, the bargaining power rests instead with the supplier.
Hence when mutual trust increases, the leading supplier controls required investment,
but the buyer does not control the number of suppliers competing in the development
process, so competition does not increase at this stage.12
Corresponding to our empirical analysis, this does not mean that trust is unimpor-
tant for procurement relationships involving complex products. But in those cases, the
supplier, being the residual claimant of the returns from investment, has no incentive to
change his choice of investment when mutual trust increases and the buyer is not able
to extract the additional rent from higher trust by increasing competition. Hence, this
explains our puzzling empirical result: We do not observe a relationship between trust
and these variables for high-tech products.
While our analysis reflects the specifics of an important economic sector in one coun-
try, it provides insights relevant for other procurement environments across industries
and countries. Key examples involve the procurement of parts for the production of
aircraft and trains, as well as for defense and aerospace procurement.13
In the next Section 2 we present the related literature. We describe the data genera-
tion and provide descriptives in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to our empirical analysis.
We describe and analyze our model in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6. An empirical
and a theoretical appendix provide additional details.
2 Related literature
We contribute to a growing literature on managerial practice in manufacturing firms
(Bloom et al., 2014), and in particular to the literature on relational contracts that by
nature must be based on mutual trust. Malcomson (2013) and Gibbons and Henderson
(2013) provide complementary surveys. See also MacLeod (2007). The importance of
relational contracts is documented in a variety of industries, ranging from the US and
Japanese automotive sectors (Helper and Henderson, 2014; Bernstein, 2015), to airlines
10Our notion of switching cost differs from the consumer switching cost established in the literature
(see Klemperer, 1995, for a survey), that is subject to strategic manipulation by the seller.
11In this case, the gains to the buyer from having the bargaining power exceed the gains to the selected
supplier from having it: Any competitive bidding process that allocates bargaining power ex-ante would
be won by the buyer.
12However, the buyer retains her residual right to deviate, and procure production from all available
suppliers – at the cost of provoking the suppliers’ deviation to a lower investment level.
13Gibbons and Henderson (2013) provide many other relevant examples.
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(Gil et al., 2016), US highway procurement (Gil and Marion, 2013), and movies (Barron
et al., 2020). They are particularly important for trading relationships when legal en-
forcement is weak, such as in developing countries(see Macchiavello, 2018, for a survey)
and in international trade (see, e.g., Antràs and Foley, 2015)). Most closely related to our
paper are McMillan and Woodruff (1999), and in particular Macchiavello and Morjaria
(2021). They show that within a weak legal system, an exogenous increase in competi-
tion in agricultural products leads relational contracting to shrink. In an earlier version
of their paper, Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015b) link the effect of increased competi-
tion directly to a decrease in reported trust towards their trading partners. Our setting
involves a strong, effective legal system, but one where competition (among suppliers
competing for a procurement contract) is endogenous. Here, the causality is reversed:
an improvement in the relationship allows buyers to increase suppliers’ competition.
Studying a change of managerial practice in a US transportation firm, Blader et al.
(2015) and Blader et al. (2020) identify complementarities between such practices and
relational contracts, supporting Gibbons and Henderson’s view that the reason why
effective managerial practices do not spread easily across firms are difficulties involved in
building and re-building relational contracts. The latter might explain why the German
VDA was so worried about the negative long-run consequences of Lopez’s disruption.
Many authors have studied the automotive industry as one of the most interesting ex-
amples of vertical relationships involving complex products. Grossman and Hart (1986),
Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Taylor and Wiggins (1997), Holmström and Roberts (1998)
or Malcomson (2013), among many others, refer to the classic Fisher-GM vertical in-
tegration case or Asanuma (1989)’s case-based description of upstream supplier-buyer
relationships in the Japanese automotive industry. Our evidence is in the same spirit,
based on the most detailed benchmarking study of this industry we are aware of.
As to relating trust and the discount factor, Kvaloy and Olsen (2009) argue in a
model of relational contracts with endogenous verification that the discount factor is
a good indicator of trust in a relationship. They also perform comparative statics to
understand how their results change with different levels of trust.14 Our notion of trust
does not encompass the multi-faceted sociological and psychological constructs that can
also be associated with the term. While we agree with Williamson (1993) that there are
good reasons for a more general view, our interpretation is likely to be the relevant one
when looking at procurement between sizeable firms.
In theoretically addressing relational contracts between one principal and several
competing agents, our model is close to a number of recent contributions including Cal-
zolari and Spagnolo (2009), Board (2011), Andrews and Barron (2016), and De Chiara
(2020).15 However, none of these models fits the relationships we observe nor exhibits
the comparative statics relevant to our data, including the allocation of bargaining power
14Bodoh-Creed (2019) defines trust and its relationship to the discount rate similarly, as does Kartal
(2018). Cabral (2005) interprets the folk theorem as a model of trust.
15Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009) extend the relational contracting model of Levin (2003) to multiple
competing agents, and show that restricting competition to a smaller set of agents helps limiting post-
contractual moral hazard, but at the risk of inducing collusion among agents against the principal.
De Chiara (2020) extends the approach to show that restricting competition/negotiations may also be
optimal to sustain pre-contractual investment. These aspects are also addressed in the legal literature.
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to different parties (on the latter, see MacLeod and Malcomson, 1998).
The economic relevance of part complexity is also addressed in the supply chain
literature. Gosh et al. (2006) argue that the vendor should take control in customizing
complex products. We obtain a similar result, resulting from a different mechanism.
Finally, our paper is closely related to the literature on incomplete contracts following
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988), and in particular to the analysis
of the role that competition plays in that setting. First, by our trade-off between com-
petition and trust, competition can reduce inefficiencies associated with hold-up (Rajan
and Zingales, 1998; Felli and Roberts, 2016). Second, when bargaining power shifts to
the supplier, the hold-up problem is resolved.
3 Data and Descriptives
Below we describe our data, the phases of buyer-supplier interaction, and the main
variables of interest. We then discuss our concept and measurement of part specific
trust in the relationship with a buyer.
3.1 Databases
The detailed questionnaire survey on which our study is based was carried out between
Fall of 2007 and Summer of 2008.16 All firms addressed by the survey had committed to
participate via their CEOs sitting on the VDA’s board. A steering committee supervised
and monitored the study in detail. It included chief procurement and sales executives
nominated by the board members. In particular, the executives participated in the
questionnaire design and phrasing of key items, ensuring a common understanding of
definitions which is crucial to our identification strategy. Their participation also ensured
the awareness of all participants that data collection and reporting would be completely
anonymous.17 The VDA board members’ commitment also included monitoring the
individual respondents’ participation.
Sample and observations All 10 German automotive producers (7 producers of
passenger cars and 3 truck makers, henceforth called buyers, or OEMs) participated in
the survey, as well as all 13 leading German parts suppliers that are members of the
A key example is Bernstein (2015). Board (2011) and Andrews and Barron (2016) study alternative
models of relational contracts in procurement, focusing more on the optimal complex dynamics of these
contracts than on the intensity of competition induced by the principal.
16It was preceded by case studies carried out between November 2005 and May 2006 that involved
numerous interviews with high ranking representatives of first-tier suppliers’ R&D, production and
marketing departments, and automotive producers’ procurement departments. Müller et al. (2016)
summarise the results of these case studies. They document in detail the relationship between producers
and their first-tier suppliers.
17This requirement also prohibits us from providing information that could identify individual firms’
responses or profiles.
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board. They in turn selected the survey respondents who were the firm’s specialists for
the topic in question.
While the survey included all German buyers, our supplier sample is not represen-
tative. It tends towards large participants, with average revenues in 2007 of 9.4 billion
euros. Even the smallest participant posted revenues of more than 700 million euros.
Yet the selection focuses on long-term supplier-buyer relationships, involving several
decades. This ensures that the survey responses indeed reflect relational contracting is-
sues.18 Furthermore, the support of the VDA’s board members ensured the completion
of the questionnaire that required considerable commitment by the respondents.
The suppliers were asked to evaluate their relationship with each participating buyer
plus, for benchmarking purposes, one outsider in relation to specified parts supplied to
the buyer. Conversely, key managers of the buyers’ procurement divisions were asked
the same questions, but in relation to their experience in the procurement of the four
parts categories defined below.
An observation is defined as a given supplier’s view on a given buyer’s procurement
practices with respect to a given part, for example spark plugs. The same supplier’s
view on that buyer’s procurement practice with respect to, for example, an electronic
stabilization program, constitutes a different observation. Different sets of questions
were addressed to the corresponding specialists in the firms.19 We merged the answers
given by all respondents on a given buyer and part across the different functions to obtain
a complete observation. Whenever segments of the questionnaire overlapped, we used
the arithmetic mean of the responses. Summarizing, an observation in our empirical
approach represents the aggregate view of the supplier’s employees on the relationship
with a given buyer, with focus on a specific part.20
Parts categories For the purposes of benchmarking and to be able to compare re-
sponses across different part-specific relationships, industry standard product group def-
initions were used, involving the following four categories:
1861% of the observed buyer-supplier relationships had lasted longer than 15 years. Among the
remaining 39 % shorter relationships, the average duration is 8.7 years. This still covers more than
8 generations of annual introductions of new car models by each OEM. Only 1% of our part-specific
observations stated a duration of the relationship of less than 4 years.
19Respondents were first asked to indicate their function within the company out of the following
seven: pre-development, vehicle development, series production, quality control, sales, logistics, and
aftermarket production. For each part and customer, they would then answer the set of questions suited
to their function within the company. See Müller et al. (2016) for a detailed description of the individual
functions and the automobile development and production process.
20With regard to survey participation, at the supplier/buyer/product group level, there are theoret-
ically 13 (suppliers) x 11 (buyers) x 4 (product groups) = 572 potential relationships. In fact, out of
the 13 suppliers, only 6 actually sell products from each product group, with 3 firms limited to 3 types
of parts, 4 firms limited to 2 types of parts, and 1 firm only selling 1 type of part. Furthermore, since
not every supplier provides parts from each product group to each buyer, the potential number of rela-
tionships is further reduced to 369. Out of these, we obtained responses for 308 different relationships.
The number of complete observations is finally reduced because respondents did not necessarily answer
all questions.
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(Low-tech) Commodities: relatively simple, technologically unsophisticated parts re-
quiring little specific investment; for example, wear parts such as brake linings;
(High-tech) Components: technologically sophisticated parts, often including a com-
bination of mechanical and electronic functionalities; for example, radar distance
sensors;
(Low-tech) Modules: technologically relatively unsophisticated part groups designed
and assembled by suppliers; for example, front-ends (body) or shock absorbers;
(High-tech) Systems: technologically sophisticated part groups designed and assembled
by suppliers; like brake systems or the electronic stabilization program, ESP.
The frequency of observations of systems (16.4%), modules (22.4%), high-tech com-
ponents (24.3%) and commodities (33.2%) varies slightly. To confirm the classification,
we flesh out their assignment using responses from the survey. First, we obtain the
share of a part’s development relative to its total costs. For a subset of products, we
also observe development costs relative to total part revenue. Second, we observe the
number of patent applications related to the part in question that were filed in the five
years prior to the survey.
The descriptives in Table 1 show that low- and high-tech parts differ significantly
w.r.t. development cost shares. Systems/components (around 10% of total costs, more
than 6% of part revenues) differ clearly from modules/commodities (7-7.5% of total
costs, 2.5-3.3% of part revenues), but not within each group. Figure 1 shows that the
corresponding differences in patent applications (last 5 years) are not quite as clear:
Perhaps surprisingly, more than 80% of low-tech parts are associated with at least 5
patent applications. The main difference is in the category of parts with more than 20
patent applications that is mainly driven by systems, the most complex part category.
We will come back below to the differences between development costs and patenting.
Development and production phases The full questionnaire, containing 185 ques-
tions plus 150 sub-questions, covers three distinct development phases that any part un-
dergoes: Pre-development, development, and series production. Pre-development covers
basic R&D activities on new technology. It is less related to individual car manufactur-
ers and models. The design of a new fuel-efficiency technology, for example, has to be
compatible with a wide range of motors from different manufacturers.
The development phase, by contrast, is focused on a given car model and buyer-
specific. The corresponding investment starts with a product planning phase and con-
tinues into product specification. The general parameters of the part being developed
are essentially based on the buyer’s request. The suppliers competitively develop a con-
cept for the part. This results in a blueprint, which in principle would enable competent
suppliers to produce the part. But switching the supplier would entail substantial costs.
A key reason is that the developing supplier’s investment and learning cannot be entirely
embodied in the blueprint. The more complex the part and thus a specific blueprint,





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of patent applications for the part under consideration.
Shares for low-tech parts in light gray, shares for high-tech parts
in dark gray.
Figure 1: Number of patent applications in 5 years prior to survey.
typically one, at most two suppliers work with their blueprints for the part selected by
the buyer, and invest in (expensive) model-specific production tools.
Part quality A key variable studied is the quality of parts. Suppliers were asked with
regard to a specific part and buyer: With respect to the part considered, how often do
quality problems occur?, measured on a 5-point scale, with 1 identifying the lowest and
5 the highest frequency, and the middle of the scale anchored at 50%. The points on
the scale are therefore interpreted as probabilities increasing from 0 to 100% in steps
of 25%. In Table 1, we observe substantial differences in quality issues arising across
part-categories, arising more frequently for systems (19.9%) and modules (24.3%) than
for the physically smaller components (12.8%) and commodities (10.3%).
Number of suppliers Figure 2 and Table 1, and in more detail Table 2 display the
number of suppliers working in the different phases for a given OEM and part selected
for the survey. In the earlier sub-phases of development, more than two competing
suppliers are tasked on average with development of the underlying technology. In the
final development phase, the number of suppliers drops to 1.60 (low-tech) and 1.35 (high-
tech parts). Alternatively speaking, in about 35-60% of part procurement processes the
manufacturer invites competing suppliers to present a blueprint for part production. At
the start of production, the number of suppliers reaches its nadir. In only 9% (high-
tech) to 28% (low-tech) of procurement relationships multiple-sourcing is immediately
implemented. In later phases of production (i.e., after 1-2 years and later) this number
increases again substantially.
The evolution of the number of parallel suppliers across the product life-cycle, de-
picted in Figure 2 and contained in Table 1, exemplify how our data –despite resulting
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Number of suppliers
Part description Pre-Dev. Dev. Ser. Prod. German market overall
Systems (high tech)
Brake system 1.8 1.4 1.0 11
Drive assist system 3 1.5 1.0 9
Engine cooling system 2.7 1.1 1.2 9
HVAC system 1.5 1.0 - 8
Injection system 2.0 1.25 1.0 7
Steering system - - 1.4 11
Transmission system 3.5 1.0 1.0 5
Modules (low tech)
Axle module 1.0 1.3 1.5 9
Body module - 5.0 1.0 9
Brake module 2.0 1.0 - 8
Chassis module 2.0 1.3 1.2 6
Cockpit - 1.0 - 5
Dashboard - - 1.0 9
Filter module - 1.3 - 15
Gearshift module 2.0 1.8 1.0 26
HVAC module 2.0 1.4 1.0 10
Piston module - 1.5 1.1 3
Roof module 2.0 1.0 1.0 34
Wiper module 2.0 1.0 1.0 20
Components (high tech)
Brake component 2.3 1.0 1.0 10
Clutch component 2.1 1.2 1.0 11
Drive assist component 2.3 1.1 1.0 19
Gearshift component 2.0 1.0 1.0 32
HVAC component - 1.3 1.2 13
Injection component 2.5 1.5 1.0 8
Injection component 2.5 1.5 1.0 8
Piston component 2.5 2.4 1.3 5
Transmission component 2.3 1.2 1.1 25
Commodities (low tech)
Axle commodity - 1.0 1.3 16
Bearings 1.6 1.9 1.3 27
Body commodity 2.2 1.0 1.0 25
Brake commodity 3.0 1.7 2.2 22
Clutch commodity 2.0 1.5 1.0 12
Engine cooling commodity - 1.0 1.0 18
Gasket commodity 1.5 1.7 1.3 14
Starter 3.0 3.0 1.0 8
Steering commodity 2.5 1.3 1.0 8
Transmission commodity 2.0 1.1 1.0 50
V-belt 1.5 2.0 1.2 17
Descriptions of the parts assessed in the benchmarking study sorted by corresponding type; for each part: (average, if applicable)
number of suppliers in pre-development, development and series production; last column: overall number of suppliers providing
this kind of part in the German market at the time of the survey, according to industry procurement database “Who supplies
whom”.
Table 2: Descriptives: Types, part descriptions and measures of internal and external
competition.
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Mean number of suppliers employed by phase of the product life-
cycle (black line), and differentiated by low-tech (light-gray) vs.
high-tech (dark-gray) parts.
Figure 2: Mean number of parallel or competing suppliers along product lifecycle.
from a cross-sectional survey– is also longitudinal in nature. Pursuant to this, Table
3 shows pairwise correlations between the number of suppliers at the different sub-
phases. Correlations are extremely high within the development and series production
sub-phases, while they are substantially lower across the different phases (e.g., devel-
opment and series production). Below we will focus on three of them: (unspecific)
pre-development, the final phase of development resulting in the blueprints, and the
start of series production.
The suppliers selected for development are typically compensated their development
expenses by a fixed lump sum payment that covers only a fraction of costs, and by a
mark-up on parts delivered to the buyer in the course of production. Table 1 contains
the suppliers’ view of compensation shares through the two channels. Between 69%
(commodities) and 88% (systems) of development costs are absorbed by the OEMs in
total through the two channels. From the perspective of the OEMs, these numbers
are substantially higher, ranging from 96% (components) to 110% (systems). The dif-
ference is likely due to differing attributions of model and buyer-specific development
expenses. Both suppliers and buyers agree, though, on the share of compensation that
is attributable to lump-sum vs. markups: Lump-sum payments contribute 34% of total
compensation according to suppliers (33% according to OEMs), mark-ups on parts pro-
duced 66% (67% according to OEMs). In view of this, cuts in the volume procured are
costly to any supplier. This will be a major focus below.
Towards extending our picture of buyer-supplier relationships by part categories, we
merged our benchmarking data with a separate commercial database, “Who supplies
whom” (WSW) collected by supplierbusiness.com. Based on reports by industry partic-
ipants, this database records actual part and model specific supply relationships between
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































evant to the German market overall at the time of the survey. The last column of Table
2 contains the numbers.
3.2 A measure of trust
Selection Central to our analysis is how we measure relationship-specific trust be-
tween suppliers and buyers in the German automotive industry. We consider trust in
a counterpart as a belief with regard to the counterpart’s type. In particular, higher
trust implies a lower subjective probability of experiencing opportunistic behavior by
the party in question –or equivalently, in higher value placed on future interactions with
the counterpart.21 The industry context and the underlying motivation for the bench-
marking study allow us to be very specific concerning the types of opportunistic behavior
that should be conducive (or detrimental) to trust.
For each phase of the part’s life-cycle (pre-development, development, production),
the questionnaire included the question Evaluate the role each of the following factors
for the automotive producer’s supplier selection, followed by a number of factors, with
importance to be evaluated on a six point scale from 1 (no relevance) to 6 (very im-
portant). The response of central interest for our study is to the factor Mutual trust
between the buyer and the supplier. Therefore, we have up to three evaluations at differ-
ent phases of the development and production process of how mutual trust contributed
to the selection of the supplier for that part, which we can consider as a relationship-
and part-specific trust variable.
We use the mean of the responses, and refer to the resulting variable as the “trust
index”. Constructing our central variable this way has several advantages. It covers
different sub-phases of the product life cycle and thus represents the views of multiple
representatives of a particular supplier. Also, it was addressed at all suppliers, as opposed
to other measures discussed below that were only addressed at subsets of the suppliers,
e.g., those who initiated the development process themselves.
Before a verification of our trust measure below we briefly discuss observed variation
in that measure across part categories and across buyers. As to variation across parts
categories, one could expect that trust is more important for complex high-tech parts
whose development and production requires more know-how by the supplier. This is
not reflected in our data. Table 4 displays the means for the four types systems (4.82,
std. dev. 0.79), modules (4.83, std. dev. 0.71), components (4.89, std. dev. 0.72) and
commodities (4.80. std. dev. 0.87). The means and standard deviations are almost
identical and cannot be statistically distinguished.
The variation in the trust measure across buyers is summarized in Figure 3. On
the one hand, the trust measure varies only insignificantly across buyers considering the
observed means. On the other hand, for each buyer there is substantial variation of
the measure across relationships with different suppliers. More than that, the example
of a given large supplier (black dots) further shows that, even for a given supplier-
buyer pair, trust may vary substantially across the individual part types supplied in this
21This is akin to the notion introduced by Gambetta (1988) and endorsed by Williamson (1993). For
a more recent definition, see Cabral (2005).
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Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min Max Obs.
Overall
Trust index 4.83 (.79) 1.5 6 296
Trust index (n) - .63 (1.06) -4 2.7 295
Systems
Trust index 4.82 (.79) 3.2 6 43
Trust index (n) - .70 (0.95) -2.5 1 43
Modules
Trust index 4.83 (.71) 3.1 6 62
Trust index (n) - .61 (1.09) -2.6 2 62
Components
Trust index 4.89 (.72) 3 6 72
Trust index (n) - .63 (1.04) -3 2.7 71
Systems
Trust index 4.80 (.87) 1.5 6 119
Trust index (n) - .63 (1.10) -4 2.3 119
Trust indices by type of product. Trust index = arithmetic mean of the avail-
able responses to the question: Please evaluate the importance of mutual trust
between the supplier and OEM for the OEM’s supplier selection, rated on a six
point scale from 1 (no relevance) to 6 (very important) across the three phases
pre-development, development and series production. Trust index (n) = normal-
ized trust index: mean of differences between importance of mutual trust and
importance of price.
Table 4: Trust index summary statistics
relationship: The typical buyer’s procurement officers are individually responsible for
specific parts, or part groups, and variation in buyer behavior can be expected across
parts even towards a given supplier, reflecting in particular the intensity of supply-side
competition.
Verification The questions regarding trust were central to the entire benchmarking
study, and thus were developed and discussed most intensely in the steering committee.
Still, there could be alternative interpretations of the questions, potentially resulting
in measurement error: In particular, respondents might state that trust is important
for the relationship in principle (so that we measure a high value), while consider it
to be lacking in practice (which we would not observe). Whether this interpretation
matters is revealed by relating the responses to further trust questions included in the
questionnaire, that link trust directly to behavior on key topics: What is the importance
of trust for your firm’s decision to initialize a pre-development with the OEM? and How
do you evaluate mutual trust between OEM and supplier with respect to honoring each
other’s intellectual property rights? Both of these measures are highly correlated with the
trust index (0.43, p-value 0.000; 0.47, p-value 0.000), which supports our interpretation
of the measure.
To further test the validity of the measure, we make use of the longitudinal aspects of
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Buyer
confidence interval average trust in buyer
observation observation (a large supplier)
Assessments of importance of trust in part-specific buyer-supplier
relationship (supplier’s perspective). Assessments by a large sup-
plier in solid black dots. Confidence interval of suppliers’ assess-
ments in gray.
Figure 3: Variation in the trust measure.
or beneficial (one item) to the supplier’s trust. For pre-development and development,
respectively, suppliers were asked to assess the frequency of conflicts with the buyer
with regard to the supplier’s IPR, as well as how often supplier IPR were leaked in
the past by the buyer to competing suppliers, resulting in four different items related
to pre-development and development phases.22 Answers are along a five-point scale,
with option three anchored at ”about 50% of cases”, so that we are able to convert the
answers to frequencies.
Table 1 shows that passing on IPR without the supplier’s consent occurs frequently,
both in the earlier and in the later phase of development. It is reported for between 30%
and 44% of all part-relationships. Not every such act is associated with conflict between
the OEM and the supplier, especially at the early stage in pre-development. At the
stage of development in which the blueprint is generated, the correlation between IPR
pass-on by the buyer and buyer-seller IPR conflicts is far larger (0.51 in development
vs. a significantly lower 0.18 in pre-development). This behavior is not necessarily less
problematic in the earlier phase, however. It might just be more difficult to prove, due
to the lack of a blueprint. At any rate, each of these four variables is associated with
opportunistic, Lopez-type behavior that should be detrimental to trust.
Two further survey items, related to suppliers’ compensation, capture aspects of
confrontational procurement strategy. First, for the series production phase, respondents
were asked to evaluate (e) the frequency of price renegotiations (demands for rebates)
in the past by the buyer. Prices are typically negotiated at the outset of a relationship
22Note that in the desire to maintain the relationship, suppliers tend not to enforce the IPRs in court.
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to vary across quantity intervals produced. It is a clear indication for opportunistic
behavior if an OEM demands further rebates beyond what is contractually agreed. This
is reported for between a quarter and a third of part-relationships. At the positive end
of the spectrum, respondents were also asked to assess (f) to which extent the buyer was
willing to assist in case of unexpected development cost overruns in the past. Opposite
of opportunistic behavior, this can be interpreted as the buyer investing in the future
relationship.
For the four IPR-measures and the demands for rebates, we expect a negative cor-
relation with a relationship-specific trust measure. For the final measure (risk-sharing),
we expect a positive correlation. Given the structure of the questionnaire, we can add a
seventh prediction: Next to the role of mutual trust, respondents also evaluated the role
that price played in the selection process. Opportunistic confrontational procurement
practices are driven by the incentive to cut costs and supplier prices. This should be
captured by the role that prices played in the supplier selection process. We use this
relationship in two different ways: First, if this holds, the relationship between the role
of trust and the role of price should be negative. Second, we construct a ”normalized”
trust index as an alternative trust measure, by subtracting the evaluation of the role of
price from the evaluated role of trust. This captures the role of trust relative to price in
supplier selection. (See Table 4 for descriptives).
Table 523 exhibits regressions of the trust index onto each of the seven measures of
interest. We control for potentially confounding factors, in particular the type of product
in question, the suppliers’ revenues as a proxy for size and bargaining power, and the
number of suppliers offering this type of product in the German market at the time of
the questionnaire (N).
The pattern is clear and unambiguous: Reported Lopez-type opportunistic behav-
ior in the past is associated with significant and substantial reductions of the trust
index.Vice versa, sharing the development risk by the OEM has a significant positive
association with the trust index. Further, the results in column (7) of Table 5 indicate
that there is in fact a tension between the roles of trust and price in supplier selection.
This makes us confident that the trust index does measure what we are interested in.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we study how the identified trust measure is related to quality issues and
competition in part procurement, and separately analyze robustness and alternative
causalities. We finally study the relationship between competition and quality issues as
well as supplier compensation.




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IPR Conflicts PD -0.470***
(0.124)




IPR Conflicts DEV -0.231***
(0.0666)




Role of Price -0.241**
(0.120)
supplier revenues (bln) 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.011** 0.008 0.008* 0.014
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
# suppliers overall -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
product type
system (D) reference category
module (D) 0.069 0.106 0.116 0.009 -0.011 0.171 0.196
(0.313) (0.170) (0.194) (0.256) (0.284) (0.210) (0.319)
component (D) 0.062 0.201 0.227 0.027 0.131 0.170 0.170
(0.218) (0.154) (0.167) (0.224) (0.237) (0.189) (0.310)
commodity (D) 0.027 -0.037 0.109 -0.138 -0.017 0.154 0.244
(0.229) (0.183) (0.197) (0.238) (0.253) (0.201) (0.285)
const 5.431 5.350 4.398 5.253 4.973 5.059 5.815
(0.269) (0.237) (0.216) (0.282) (0.261) (0.218) (0.694)
Observations 121 241 220 179 159 193 126
R-squared 0.143 0.121 0.033 0.087 0.068 0.093 0.059
Dependent variable: Trust index; coefficients and (p-values) reported; robust standard errors clustered at level of buyer-seller
pairs. PD = Pre-development; DEV = Development; * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.
Table 5: Determinants of the Trust Index: OLS regressions
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4.1 Trust and quality
The quality of individual parts is a strategic concern for manufacturers. Part quality
contributes to and determines the quality and utility of the final product. It is typically
not precisely observable for researchers, unless it leads to recalls of vehicles. Yet our
questionnaire response provides us with a measure that is generally not observable to
outsiders.
When trying to empirically assess quality issues, difficulties typically arise as (a)
observed failure rates of automobiles often cannot be linked to individual parts, (b)
quality problems found and solved before the parts are installed are not reported at all,
and (c) buyer diligence or skill in assembling the final product may affect the contribution
of a part to overall quality. Our responses are relationship and part-specific, which
immediately solves (a). To overcome issue (b), the question in the survey was phrased as
quality problem regarding the part, not the final product. Buyer complementary effort or
skill is addressed by introducing a dummy for each of the eleven buyers in our regressions,
that captures the buyer’s effect on quality, taking care of issue (c). However, self-
reporting of problems by suppliers –though anonymous– may lead to under-reporting.
Assuming that more trust would lead to a higher likelihood of admitting problems in
the questionnaire, we would only underestimate the actual effect.
As we will make use of below, part quality is an outcome of unobserved investment
and effort by the supplier, a standard interpretation in the literature (Taylor and Wig-
gins, 1997; Womack et al., 1991). After controlling for factors such as part type (failure
rates increasing in part complexity), market characteristics (failure rates driven down by
competition), supplier size (more resources and capabilities) and buyer identity (buyer
engagement in complementary investment), the remaining variation in observed part
failures should be strongly associated with the supplier’s effort and investment.
Our baseline specification is
yijs = β ∗ xijs + γ ∗ Zijs + κ+ αj + εijs, (1)
where yijs is the frequency of quality problems arising for part i supplied to buyer j by
supplier s, xijs is the related trust measure Zijs are control variables, κ is a constant,
and αj a buyer fixed-effect. As motivated above, the control variables include dummies
for the part type, the supplier’s revenues in 2007 as a measure of size and market power,
as well as the number of external competitors in Germany, N , derived from the WSW
database. We estimate a fractional probit model taking the non-linear nature of the
dependent variable into account as well as an OLS specification as a reference (results
reported in the online appendix). As in all following specifications, we estimate robust
standard errors clustered at the level of buyer-seller pairs.24
Table 6 contains the results. Columns 1 (without) and 2 (with buyer fixed effects)
show that higher levels of trust are associated with significantly fewer quality prob-
lems. Neither supplier size nor number of competitors supplying the given part matter.
24All results are robust to alternative specifications of clusters, in particular clustering at the level of
buyer and part-type to account for procurement strategies.
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Frequency of Quality Problems
Variables Fractional Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust index -0.034** -0.043***
(0.015) (0.016)
Trust index (low-tech) -0.050***
(0.018)
Trust index (high-tech) -0.028
(0.033)
Trust index (low dev. costs) -0.012**
(0.006)
Trust index (high dev. costs) -0.003
(0.006)
Trust index (below median patents) -0.016**
(0.008)
Trust index (above median patents) -0.018**
(0.007)
product type
system (D) reference category
module (D) -0.028 -0.032 0.083 -0.021 -0.028
(0.083) (0.084) (0.210) (0.051) (0.051)
component (D) -0.165** -0.175** -0.145*** -0.155*** -0.146***
(0.0768) (0.0763) (0.0550) (0.0529) (0.0514)
commodity (D) -0.177** -0.183** -0.0531 -0.170*** -0.178***
(0.0734) (0.0754) (0.207) (0.0508) (0.0514)
supplier revenues (bln) -0.00123 -0.00135 -0.00124 -0.00173 -0.00143
(0.00153) (0.00134) (0.00141) (0.00151) (0.00146)
N 0.00104 0.00105 0.00106 0.00152 0.00149
(0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00107) (0.00104) (0.00112)
Buyer-FE (11) no yes yes yes yes
# observations 126 126 126 126 126
Dependent variable: Frequency of quality problems arising (in percent). Avg. marginal effects and (std.err.) reported. Robust
standard errors clustered at level of buyer-seller pairs. * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.
Table 6: Trust and quality issues (proxy for investment): Fractional Probit results
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For larger parts (systems and modules), the type dummies show that quality problems
arise with significantly and substantially higher frequency. Including buyer dummies
strengthens the relationship in focus. In the absence of buyer fixed effects, the strength
of the trust/quality (or the suppliers’ investment) relationship is underestimated. This
indicates that a trusting buyer invests more in quality.
According to the estimates, the incidence of quality issues per standard deviation
of the trust index (0.79, Table 4) is between 2.77 and 3.95 percentage points lower,
compared to the observed average incidence of quality issues of 14.1%. A one standard
deviation increase in the trust index would therefore be associated with a reduction in
the incidence of quality issues of between 19.6% and 28,0% relative to the average rate.
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 6 provide more detail. Is, as one might expect, the strength
of the relationship relevant primarily for the high-tech rather than the low-tech parts?
In column 3, we interact the trust index with the relevant indicator variable. It shows,
perhaps surprisingly, that the relationship between trust and quality continues to matter
significantly only for low-tech parts. For high-tech parts, the coefficient is half the size
and not even close to significant.
Does the pattern still hold when we account for the substantial differences in embed-
ded research and development between low- and high-tech parts? Recall that low-tech
and high-tech parts differ especially w.r.t. R&D-efforts, but less so w.r.t. patenting
intensity. Now, patented research (R) differs from development (D) effort embedding
the part into a specific car model. IPR embedded in patents can be enforced in court,
while relationship-specific development efforts embedded in the proprietary blueprint
cannot.25 Furthermore, patents contain public information that is transferable at low
cost, while the experience in development effort is not.
We thus define variables indicating whether a part is associated with a higher or
lower number of patents than the median, and with a development cost share of total
costs above or below the observed median. In column 4 we interact trust with the
development cost, and in column 5 with the patent indicator. As the coefficients in the
latter are almost identical, the difference in patent protection cannot be responsible for
the difference in results by part groups. The trust/quality association is significant only
when the development cost share is relatively low. With our theoretical model, we will
provide explanations for this perhaps puzzling finding.
4.2 Trust and quality: causality and robustness
What about causality in the observed association between trust and quality? Quality
problems, typically caused by under-investment, could impose a burden on mutual trust
especially on the buyer-side. This could be further exacerbated by some form of legal
confrontation. However, quality issues are not related to empirical observations of legal
conflict between suppliers and buyers. In 99.5% of our part-specific relationships the
respondents report relationship histories without any legal conflict.
25However, even if patented, the supplier’s IPRs are much less well protected than one might ex-
pect, which is reflected by buyers passing on supplier IPRs in about 31% of the observed development
relationships.
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Further details on the relationship history may contribute to a better understanding.
We observe the past frequency of the perhaps most controversial Lopez-style behavior,
leaks of supplier IPR by the buyer to competing suppliers without the owner’s consent.
There are two ways to use this information to study causality. As an explanatory variable
replacing the trust index in the previous regression (i.e., as a reduced form instrument),
or as an instrument for the trust index in an IV regression.26
Frequency of Quality Problems
Variables Fractional Probit IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Freq. IPR pass on 0.022* 0.023*
(0.012) (0.012)
Trust index (instrumented) -0.048** -0.051*
(0.023) (0.030)
product type
system (D) reference category
module (D) -0.020 -0.023 0.002 -0.011
(0.075) (0.077) (0.082) (0.073)
component (D) -0.151** -0.160** -0.133* -0.154***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.059)
commodity (D) -0.179*** -0.185*** -0.159** -0.170***
(0.062) (0.064) (0.072) (0.063)
supplier revenues (bln) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.454*** 0.544***
(0.137) (0.167)
First stage F stat 31.3 10.6
Buyer-FE (11) no yes no yes
# observations 122 122 109 109
R-squared 0.225 0.257
Fractional Probit and IV regressions; dependent variable: frequency of quality problems arising (in percent). IV-approach:
trust instrumented by frequency of supplier IPR passed on by the OEM in the past, reported by supplier. Fractional Probit:
Marginal effects and (std.err.) reported. IV: Coefficients and (std.err.) reported. Robust standard errors clustered at level of
buyer-seller pairs. * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.
Table 7: Trust and quality issues (proxy for investment): Reduced form instrument and
IV results
Table 7 contains the results for both approaches. In columns 1 and 2 the reduced-
form instrument shows that more frequent pass-on of IPR in the past is associated
with a significantly higher incidence of quality issues occurring today. Columns 3 and 4
show that employing IPR pass-on as an instrumental variable is feasible (first stage F-
statistics are above 10 for each specification) despite the limited number of observations;
26The exclusion restriction requires that passing on IPR in the past does not directly affect quality
issues arising in later phases of production, except through the trust channel.
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the association between trust (instrumented) and quality becomes slightly stronger and
remains significant. Therefore, the empirical evidence is in favor of an interpretation in
which mutual trust impacts part quality.27
In the online appendix, we carry out further robustness checks of this central result.
In particular, we show that the result also holds for the alternative normalized trust
index, when we introduce seller fixed effects, as well as for a further alternative trust
measure that captures ”directional” trust of the supplier in the buyer, and therefore
neutralizes the possible channel of reverse causality described above.
4.3 Trust and competition
There are two ways to think about competition between suppliers in our setting. First,
N potential suppliers are able to produce a given part, which we take from the WSW
database. Second, n suppliers selected by the buyer compete to develop the part, and
for production.
According to Figure 2 the average number of suppliers employed by the buyer differs
along the part life-cycle. The nature of competition differs as well, from open compe-
tition regarding the quality of the blueprint in pre-development and development, to
competition more latent in parallel series production. While all suppliers selected by
the buyer for product-specific development are remunerated on average about 1/3 of de-
velopment costs as a lump sum, only the winning supplier(s) can collect the remainder
of their cost through markups on parts produced. To assess how competition induced
by the buyer varies with trust, we consider the number of suppliers involved in a part-
specific relationship during pre-development, final development, and at the start of series
production.
The dependent variable in our Poisson regressions is the count variable nijs, the
number of parallel suppliers involved in producing part i for buyer j from the perspective
of supplier s in each of the three phases pre-development, development, and production.
The independent variables are as before. Sometimes we include the ”role of price”
variable introduced previously: We hypothesize that price plays a larger role in the
selection process if the buyer has the incentive to induce more intense competition among
suppliers.
Table 8 contains the results. In the pre-development phase (columns 1 through 3),
we observe no association between trust and the number of competitors. The same holds
for the role of price (column 3). Despite the smaller number of observations, this is not
a result of larger standard errors –especially in the specification with buyer dummies,
the coefficient of trust is close to zero.
By contrast, in development and series production, both involving substantial relationship-
specific investment, the association between trust and supplier competition is significant
and large. In the development phase, during which suppliers are competing with their
27Note that the reduced-form approach is not limited only to IPR pass-on by the OEM, but can
be applied to different types of IPR conflict, as reflected by Table 15 in the online appendix. This
finding strengthens the assumption underlying the exclusion restriction, as these past patterns of buyer









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































blueprints to obtain production contracts, (columns 4 through 6), an increase in trust
by one standard deviation (0.79) is related to about 0.13 or 8.4% more suppliers when
compared to the average of 1.55 suppliers involved in this phase. Furthermore, the role
of price is significantly and positively associated with the number of suppliers selected
by the buyer (column 6). Finally, in the series production phase (columns 7 through 9),
an increase of the trust index by one standard deviation is associated with 0.11 or 14%
more suppliers when compared to the average of 1.27 suppliers engaged in production.
Yet the correlation between the role of price and number of suppliers is, while positive,
no longer significant.
Two aspects provide further insights into the buyer’s motivation to employ more than
one supplier in the development phase. First, larger suppliers (measured by revenues)
tend to face significantly more competition, which may be result from an effort by
the buyers to countermand larger players’ better relative bargaining position. Second,
more external market competition by a larger set of potential suppliers for a given part
is associated with significantly fewer suppliers selected in both the development and
production phases. This suggests that competition induced among the chosen suppliers
within a given part-procurement and in the wider market are substitutes.
In Table 9, we again interact the trust index with a high tech-dummy in the re-
gressions of each of the development phases. As in the trust/quality regressions, the
association between trust and competition is significant only for low-tech parts, i.e.,
commodities and modules, and only in the phases development and series production.
Joint F-tests reveal that for high-tech parts, the effect is insignificant (dev.: p-value 0.36;
ser. prod.: p-value 0.95).
4.4 The effects of competition on quality and compensation
We have shown how trust between part suppliers and buyers is related to the quality
of parts and the degree of competition in development competition and production
induced by buyers. Perhaps most surprisingly, trust is associated with a larger number
of suppliers involved in both development and series production. In the next step we
study how competition is related to part quality and supplier compensation.
Focusing first on competition and quality, we claim that increasing trust implies
increases in both. There is an immediate possible alternative explanation for the con-
nection between the three variables: Tougher competition between suppliers forces them
to exert more effort, or allows the buyer to select higher quality suppliers. Either of these
effects would cause lower failure rates. Trust would then be the result of lower failure
rates rather than their cause.
If this were the explanation for the observed pattern, then we should see signif-
icantly lower failure rates in relationships involving tougher competition in possibly
pre-development, development and series production. We directly test this alternative
hypothesis using the familiar empirical specification. the dependent variable is the rate
of part, buyer and supplier specific quality problems, and the main explanatory variable
is the number of suppliers at the different phases; added are the familiar vector of the
controls, a constant, and a buyer-fixed effect. If the actual relationships that matter
25
Number of Suppliers
Pre-Dev. Dev. Ser. Prod.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
trust index (low-tech) .033 .185*** .174***
(.674) (.007) (.001)
trust index (high-tech) -.053 .100 -.004
(.597) (.363) (.946)
supplier revenues (bln) .003 .019*** .001
(.470) (.000) (.852)




module (D) -.405 .293 -.746**
(.570) (.543) (.042)
component (D) .021 .331* .141
(.895) (.097) (.277)
commodity (D) -.300 .232 .141
(.674) (.646) (.130)
const .768 -.618 -.358
(.142) (.179) (.311)
Buyer-FE (11) yes yes yes
# observations 78 127 126
Pseudo-R2 .013 .083 .047
Dependent variables: number of parallel suppliers at the different development phases; coefficients and (p-values)
reported; robust standard errors clustered at level of buyer-seller pairs; * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at
1%.
Table 9: Trust and competition for low- vs. high-tech parts: Poisson-regressions
are between trust and quality/competition, respectively, then omitting the trust vari-
able should lead to an (indirect) positive correlation between competition and quality.
Therefore we include trust as an additional control in columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 10
below.
There is no significant negative effect of the number of competing suppliers on failure
rates. Higher levels of competition are not related to lower levels of part failures. If,
by the alternative explanation, the correlation with trust really were only a by-product,
then we should see stronger correlation between competition and failure frequencies
than between the two and trust. Yet we observe the opposite. For the phases involving
relationship-specific investment, there is no significant effect, and for pre-development
we even get the opposite of the expected sign (i.e., more supplier competition is related
to higher levels of part failures).
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Frequency of Quality Problems
Pre-Dev. Dev. Ser. Prod.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# suppliers .039** .045*** -.004 .004 -.010 -.001
(.018) (.014) (.015) (.015) (.023) (.025)
trust index -.052** -.044*** -.041**
(.022) (.015) (.018)
supplier revenues .002** .002* -.001 -.001 -.002* -.003*
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
# suppliers overall .005*** .005*** .001 .001 .001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
product type
system (D) reference category
module (D) .067 .018 -.020 -.038 -0.133* -0.140
(.104) (.090) (.071) (.082) (.079) (.092)
component (D) -.208*** -.209*** -.163** -.179** -.234*** -.243***
(.062) (.055) (.064) (.074) (.072) (.081)
commodity (D) -.157*** -.149*** -.176*** -.188*** -.243*** -.247***
(.058) (.056) (.061) (.073) (.079) (.090)
Buyer-FE (11) yes yes yes yes yes yes
# observations 73 73 126 126 126 126
Dependent variable: Frequency of quality issues arising for the part in question (percent); coefficients and (std.err.)
reported; standard errors (reported) clustered at the level of buyer-seller pairs; *sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; ***
sign. at 1%
Table 10: Quality, competition and trust: Fractional Probit-regressions
Furthermore, in the specifications including the trust measure, the relationship be-
tween competition and quality problems remains unchanged, while the coefficient of
trust remains highly significant. This further indicates that the driver of the observed
pattern is trust. In addition, the fact that we do not observe a significant positive corre-
lation between competition and quality issues could indicate that at the margin buyers
in fact use additional slack from higher trust to either induce additional competition or
to enforce higher investment by suppliers.
Therefore, it is particularly important to better understand the role that competition
plays for our central outcomes. For this, we now return to the compensation measures
introduced in Subsection 3.1. We analyze how competition (and trust) are related to
the share of suppliers’ costs that is reimbursed via lump-sum payments, markups on
parts produced, and overall. We run regressions using the familiar specifications, with
the share of costs compensated by part, buyer and supplier separately estimated for the
shares compensated via lump-sum, markups and overall. In Table 11, columns 1 to 3
the main control of interest is the number of suppliers in the development phase, and in
columns 4 to 6 at start of production.
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Shares of development cost compensated by the OEM
Variables Total♠ Mark-Up♣ Lump-sum♥ Total♠ Mark-Up♣ Lump-sum♥
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
trust index .072 .066* .006 .062 .061 .001
(.050) (.038) (.036) (.051) (.039) (.036)
# suppliers devt. -.102** .050* -.053
(.051) (.030) (.039)
# suppliers prod. -.166*** -.098** -.068
(.039) (.043) (.043)
# suppliers overall .000 0̇00 .000 .000 .000 .000
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.003) (.003) (.002)
supplier revenues .000 .001 -.001 -.001 .004 -.001
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.003) (.003) (.001)
product type
system (D) reference category
module (D) .216* .150 .065 .155 0.127 0.028
(.124) (.121) (.112) (.130) (.124) (.108)
component (D) -.074 .024 -.098 -.118 .008 -.125
(.101) (.110) (.090) (.103) (.112) (.085)
commodity (D) -.181 -.093 -.088 -.141 -.052 -.089
(.131) (.118) (.113) (.132) (.124) (.103)
const .679 .359 .320 .756 .404 .352
(.266) (.209) (.173) (.267) (.210) (.174)
Buyer-FE (11) yes yes yes yes yes yes
# observations 113 113 113 110 110 110
R2 .290 .307 .252 .306 .323 .250
Dependent variables: ♠ total share of development costs compensated ♣ share of development costs compensated via
mark-ups ♥ share of development costs compensated via lump-sum payments – coefficients and (std.err.) reported;
robust standard errors clustered at the level of buyer-seller pairs. * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.
Table 11: Compensation of suppliers for development costs and competition: OLS re-
gressions
The results clearly indicate that more suppliers involved in development and compe-
tition are related to significantly lower compensation shares for the (winning) suppliers.
The statistically stronger, i.e., more significant, effect concerns the mark-ups, instead of
the lump-sum payments. An additional competitor in development is associated with a
reduction of the overall compensation share by more than 10 percentage points. Differ-
entiating between channels shows that half of this is caused by lower compensation via
mark-up, while the effect on lump sum compensation is of similar size, but statistically
less significant. An additional supplier in the production phase is associated with a
reduction of overall compensation by 16.6 percentage points. Compensation via mark-
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ups is reduced by 9.8 percentage points, which results from a possible combination of
reduced margins and lower production volumes.
5 A Model of Buyer-Supplier Relations
In our model we focus on key elements of the relational contracts that prevail in the
German automotive industry. These elements are common to long-term buyer-supplier
contracting relationships involving complex, buyer-specific parts with high development
costs that are not easily adapted by suppliers not involved in the model-buyer-supplier
specific development process.
The variables in our relational contract are determined alternatively by the typical
buyer (when she has the bargaining power), or by the leading supplier (when he has the
bargaining power). We identify the equilibrium of the repeated game that is best from
the buyer’s point of view vs. the supplier’s point of view .
We then endogenize the party who has the bargaining power. For differing costs
of switching to a non-developing supplier arising to the buyer, we identify the value
of the repeated relationship to the buyer vs. the supplier. When, as for the supply
of low-tech parts, that cost is low, the value of the relationship to the buyer is higher
than that to the supplier; when, as for the supply of high-tech parts, that cost is high,
the opposite is true. Any competitive allocation mechanism would then imply that the
bargaining power rests with the buyer for low tech parts and the supplier for high tech
parts. This results in drastic differences in the comparative statics with respect to the
discount factor, our proxy for the trust measure employed in the empirical analysis.
These differences correspond to those we observe in the data.
5.1 The model
In each period t of an infinite sequence of periods a buyer needs to procure an innovative
intermediate product. This entails first the development of a buyer-specific blueprint
for such a product, which requires substantive specific investment I > 0 by the typical
supplier, and subsequently the manufacturing of that product. We assume that the
investment I is neither observable nor contractible. The investment cost is sunk and
normalized to I for I units of investment.
There are N > 1 firms capable of developing and supplying the intermediate product,
by having invested in the pre-development phase (less connected to the buyer and not
analyzed here). To simplify our analysis we assume that from the buyer’s view, the N
firms are identical at the outset.28 In each period t the buyer selects a strict subset
nt(< N) of the N firms for the development and the production of the part.
29 In
case several suppliers are chosen by the buyer, the suppliers invest independently and
28In Subsection 5.3 we modify this assumption to allow for the buyer’s selection of a favorite supplier.
29In our data we have verified that N > 1, so there is potential competition among suppliers for each
part considered.
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competitively. As investment is buyer-specific, it has no value for buyers other than the
one for whom the intermediate product is developed.
The value to the buyer of the final product with embedded investment It is v(It),
where v(·) is increasing, strictly concave and satisfying Inada conditions.30 We denote
with v0 the value of procurement to the buyer if she stays in the relationship but the
supplier’s buyer-specific investment is nil; and with vS the value to the buyer in case she
leaves an established procurement relationship and starts procuring anew. The suppliers’
outside option is normalized to zero. The investment fully depreciates at the end of the
period.
After the development phase, a single supplier is chosen by the buyer from possibly
the N suppliers to produce the part.31 Supplier i’s cost of production in period t is
θit, assumed to be i.i.d. across suppliers and across periods, and drawn from a time-
invariant distribution F (θit) with support [θmin, θmax]. The realization of each supplier’s
production cost is unknown to the buyer – although, for simplicity and without loss of
generality, it becomes known to the other n suppliers.
Within the current period t, the buyer may ask supplier i to produce the intermediate
product using the blueprint developed by another supplier j within the same period.
Yet, for suppliers that did not participate in the development phase, this necessitates
an adjustment cost k discussed below.
This procurement process is repeated over an infinite horizon. The stage game in-
volving the typical period t (we henceforth delete subscript t to ease notation) involves
the following timing:
t1 (Selection for development): When the buyer has the bargaining power, she selects
n potential suppliers to participate in the development of a blueprint for the intermediate
product. The buyer can then specify a minimal level of investment I she expects the
selected suppliers to undertake. Furthermore, the buyer formally commits to pay a
transfer w to each participant at the end of the development phase t2.
When the leading supplier has the bargaining power, he commits to invest a specific
level I towards the development of the part. Furthermore, he determines the transfer
payment w he requires from the buyer towards his development investment.
t2 (Development): Each supplier i participating in the development stage incurs
investment Ii. The investment remains unobserved by the buyer until the end of t4. The
buyer pays transfer w to each of the n suppliers.
t3 (Selection for production): The buyer invites ñ suppliers to compete in an auction
that allocates the production contract to a unique supplier h, and sets the price p payable
on delivery of the intermediate product. When selecting a non-developing supplier to
produce with the blueprint from a developing supplier the buyer needs to account for an
30As mentioned above we assume I to be neither observable not contractible, however we take v(I)
to be closely related to the quality outcome of the investment and as such related to the inverse of the
frequency of part related quality problems in our empirical analysis. This is in line with the relational
contracting framework: a party’s action is not observable by the counterpart, yet its outcome is.
31See the Theoretical Appendix for the case of more than one supplier selected by the buyer, that is
multiple sourcing.
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ex-ante uncertain adjustment cost k ≥ 0 that is realised at this stage and that is private
to and incurred by her.32 The number and identity of the ñ firms invited at the auction
is public information. The production cost θi for each of these suppliers is realized right
before the auction takes place.
t4 (Production): The selected supplier h produces at cost θh and receives p from
the buyer. At the end of the stage game, the buyer observes the investment of the n
suppliers invited to the development phase of the procurement process.33
In what follows we focus on stationary strategies of the infinitely repeated interac-
tion. In t1, let the buyer have the bargaining power. She will choose the performance
requirement specified by the investment I, and commit to the transfer w. In t3 she
commits to invite to the auction only the ñ suppliers that were selected at t1 for the de-
velopment stage. The buyer would then exclude from further procurement any supplier
who in the last stage game has not complied with the performance requirements I ≥ I.
Conversely, the suppliers would collectively refuse to fulfil their strategy requirements
in future stage games if in the previous stage game confronted with the buyer’s decision
to procure from (any of) the N − n non-investing suppliers.
If in t1 the leading supplier has the bargaining power, he will choose the level of
investment I and formally commit to the transfer w. In stage t3 the buyer will then
commit to allocate the production contract to the leading supplier that managed the
development stage: ñ = 1. The suppliers will then collectively refuse to fulfil their
strategy requirements in future stage games if confronted with the buyer’s decision, in
the previous stage game, to procure from the N − 1 non-investing suppliers.
The assumption that the suppliers are identical ex ante is made for simplicity. As
standard in the relational contracting literature and consistent with evidence from our
survey, the transfer w is assumed contractible and, as such, enforceable by the courts.
Both the level Ii invested by the typical supplier i at t2 and the number ñ of suppliers
admitted to compete for production at t3 are not contractible and determined in equi-
librium. If ñ > 1 the buyer (optimally) allocates the production contract with a second
price auction.
Both the level of I and whether suppliers for production are selected from the set
of developing suppliers, ñ ∈ n, are not contractible in real life as well.34 Although
32This cost is related to the training of such a non-developing supplier. It naturally reflects the idea
that the production of complex parts not developed in-house requires the costly adaptation of skills and
tools. Indeed, the deviation corresponds to Lopez’ strategy (discussed in the Introduction) of sending
teams of engineers for weeks on site to non-developing outsiders, to train them to reliably produce the
part on the basis of a competing supplier’s blueprint.
33Alternatively, investments in blueprints not used in production could be non-observable. At the
cost of an additional incentive compatibility constraint, we could have modelled this possibility. This
constraint would be needed to prevent that a firm i set Ii = 0, planning to avoid winning the auction
and instead systematically cashing in w (if positive). This constraint would have no effect on our results.
34As to I, the steering committee in charge of the survey (used in the previous sections) decided to
abstain from including questions on it in the questionnaire, as even the experts directly involved in the
development and the production of the parts were unable to disentangle the general from the idiosyn-
cratic components of investment in the development of a part. As for not including non-developing
suppliers in ñ, the only way in which this could be included in a contract would have to be contingent
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I and ñ are not contractible, as clear from the strategies specified above, the infinite
repetition of the stage game allows the buyer and the suppliers to rely on relational
contracting, threatening to enact mutual punishments at the end of t4 after deviations
from equilibrium levels of I and ñ. The observability of all investments directly before is
clearly a strong assumption. However, similar results could be obtained assuming that
the buyer only observes imperfect but informative signals of the investments.
As we have seen in the previous sections, there is significant duplication of investment
in the development phase. We interpret this observation as an indication that the
expected adjustment cost E(k) is large enough so that the buyer prefers to avoid the
unbundling of the blueprints development and production altogether, e.g., by having
just one firm investing for a blueprint and all firms competing for production.35 We
also assume that the buyer cannot make contingent payments such as discretionary
bonuses.36
The discount factor is unity across all phases of the same stage game, and δ ≤ 1
across different stage games. In line with the literature on trust and relational contracts
discussed in Section 2 we interpret δ, common to both the buyer and the suppliers,
as an indicator of the mutual trust the participants in the game associate with future
co-operation. The common δ directly reflects the relevant question in the questionnaire
survey, that mutual trust is the commonly understood level of trust between the buyer
and her suppliers.
The game as described has a continuum of equilibria. In Subsection 5.2 below we
focus on the equilibrium most profitable for the buyer, and in Subsection 5.3 on the one
most profitable for the suppliers that participate in the development stage and obtain
the production contract, respectively. In Subsection 5.4 we identify which equilibria
we expect to see depending on whether we are considering the supply of low-tech, or
high-tech parts.
5.2 Buyer’s bargaining power
In this section we identify and analyze the equilibrium procurement relational contract
that is most profitable for the buyer.
We consider symmetric stationary relational contracts where both the n suppliers
each develop the required blueprint by undertaking investment I ≥ I, and the buyer ab-
stains from inviting more than the announced n suppliers to compete for the production
contract.37
on the value of k. But this is private information of the buyer and only identified after the blueprint
has been selected. Hence the buyer could easily claim a low k, and with it expand ñ to include non-
developing suppliers.
35See the Theoretical Appendix for the optimality of bundling when E(k) is large enough. Notice
that even Lopez (discussed in the Introduction) did not factually procure the production from non-
developing suppliers. He rather incurred the cost k to train non-developing suppliers, and used their
price quotation to depress the winning developer’s price.
36Empirically, we are not aware of any public or private procurement practice in which ex post
monetary bonuses are regularly used, and the German car industry is no exception.
37Stationarity is without loss of generality with a single agent-supplier (Levin, 2003). Board (2011)
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In the development phase, each of these suppliers decides how much to invest, antici-
pating the expected rent β(n)π(n) associated with the production contract in this stage
game, where β(n) denotes the probability that a supplier will obtain the production
contract among the n suppliers, and π(n) the expected rent to that supplier accruing
from production. Since by assumption the suppliers are ex ante identical, β(n) = 1/n.
If n > 1, the expected rent obtained by the winning supplier is π(n) = θe(2) (n) −
θe(1)(n), where θ
e
(1)(n) is the expected cost of the efficient supplier and θ
e
(2)(n) that of the
second-most efficient one. In the second price auction the suppliers reveal their costs
in their bids. The winning supplier then sells his intermediate product at the price
p = θ(2)(n). If instead n = 1, then obviously β(1) = 1, the single supplier’s expected
rent is π(1) = p−θe(1) where θe(1) = E(θ), and p is the price the buyer and the supplier
agree to at t3.
A non-deviating supplier will optimally just satisfy the buyer’s requirement by in-
vesting I = I. His expected payoff over the infinite horizon game is then
[w − I + β(n)π(n)] 1
1− δ
.
If instead the supplier decides to deviate and invest less than required, then he knows
that the buyer will observe the deviation at the end of the stage game and he will be
excluded from all future procurement by this buyer. Accordingly, it is optimal for him
to set I = 0, and his expected profit is
w + β(n)π(n).
The supplier prefers not to deviate and invest I if the incentive compatibility constraint
w + β(n)π(n) ≥ I
δ
(2)
is satisfied. Hence he chooses I as required if the sum of the transfer w and the expected
rent from winning production β(n)π(n) is not smaller than the contemporaneous cost
of the required investment I/δ. This cost is high if δ is small. Indeed, in such a case the
typical supplier would face a stronger temptation to cheat in the investment phase, and




θe(1) if n = 1
θe(2)(n) if n > 1
be the price the buyer expects to pay when n firms compete for production.
When the n suppliers choose the required investment I in the development stage,
has shown that a principal-buyer may want to follow a non-stationary initial phase that leads to a stable
group of preferred agents-suppliers. The equilibria that we consider here can be seen as the long-run
steady state of this type of transition.
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the buyer’s infinite horizon payoff at t3 is
v(I)− pe(n) + [v(I)− nw − pe(n)] δ
1− δ
.
Alternatively, at t3 the buyer could deviate and invite ñ > n suppliers to compete.
In this case it would be optimal for the buyer to choose ñ = N , that is, to invite all
available suppliers within the current stage game in order to take advantage of selecting
the supplier with the lowest production cost from the largest set possible, thus paying
a price pe(N) smaller than pe(n). Consequently, following a deviation, the buyer would
expect that no supplier would ever invest in the future, and thus set the transfers w′ so
as to extract all the sellers’ informational rents. The buyer’s expected discounted payoff
from deviating would then be




where the terms in the first bracket reflect her return in the current period, accounting for
the cost of adapting the technology in case the producer ends up being a non-developer;
and those in the second bracket her returns in the future stage games (where the buyer
would have to rely on zero investment, maximal competition and transfer w′).38
The buyer prefers not to deviate by inviting to the auction more than the n partici-
pants in the development stage, if the incentive compatibility constraint
δ [v(I)− nw − (v0 −Nw′)] + (1− δ)k
N − n
N
≥ pe(n)− pe(N) (4)
is satisfied. The right hand side is the expected savings in the buyer’s payment for the
production of the intermediate good from having all N rather than n firms compete. The
left hand side is instead the loss in the value of procurement she will face in the future,
net of the difference between the equilibrium transfers nw and the ones associated to a
deviation Nw′ and the cost of adaptation. All else given, when δ is small the buyer also
has a stronger temptation to deviate, benefiting from the (expected) reduction in the
cost of production.
The optimal procurement program PB of the buyer is then
max
I,w,n
[v(I)− wn− pe(n)] 1
1− δ
s.t. w + β(n)π(n) ≥ I/δ (ICs)
δ [v(I)− nw − (v0 − π(N))] + (1− δ)kN−nN ≥ p
e(n)− pe(N). (ICb)
(5)
If the buyer wants to induce high investment, she has to account for the typical
38The expected cost of adaptation (third expression in the first bracket in equation (3)) reflects the
idea that all N firms are treated equally at the auctions. Although the expression of this cost would
be different if the buyer treated differently those in n and the others, the idea and the consequences of
the adaptation costs would remain the same.
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supplier’s incentive not to deviate, represented by (ICs). Increasing the number n of
competing suppliers has several effects. First, it reduces the expected price pe(n) the
buyer has to pay, as production costs are drawn from a larger set of suppliers. Second,
it reduces the buyer’s temptation to deviate, since the difference in the production cost
she has to bear between inviting n firms vs. all N firms to compete, pe(n) − pe(N) in
(ICb), decreases in n.
39 Finally, it adversely affects the typical supplier’s incentive to
provide the required investment, because the expected rent β(n)π(n) to the supplier also
decreases in n.
It is immediate to see that in the optimum the buyer always reduces the (positive or
negative) transfer w to a minimum, so that the incentive constraint (ICs) is binding:
w + β(n)π(n) = I/δ, (6)
which both increases the value of her objective function and relaxes her incentive con-
straint (ICb). This leads to a simple yet interesting set of observations on the two main
procurement choice variables: the level of competition n and of investment I.
Proposition 1 In the equilibrium optimal for the buyer, a higher discount factor δ is
associated with
(i) a higher level of investment I, for given n,
(ii) a larger number of suppliers n, for given I.
Hence, when δ increases, the buyer can afford to invite a higher number n of com-
peting suppliers (at given w and I), which implies a lower expected production cost.
An analogous reasoning applies to result (i). The intuition is that a higher discount
factor δ grants the buyer some “slackness” in dealing with suppliers’ incentives, which
in turn translates into better procurement terms: more competition—that is lower cost
of production—and/or higher investment—that is higher value for the final product.
The overall effects of a change of δ on the actual terms of procurement that solve PB
are more involved than the comparative statics of Proposition 1. Imagine, for example,
that an increase of δ induces a higher level of investment. The overall effect of this
increase in δ on n must then account not only for the direct effect described in point (ii)
of Proposition 1, but also for the indirect effect due to the increased investment. If the
latter is large enough, then a higher δ may actually call for a reduction in the number of
firms, because the buyer should grant larger informational rents to create incentives for
the selected suppliers to invest even more. In order to account for the indirect effects we




Rather than providing a full solution to program PB, here we exploit some of its
properties to verify conditions under which the general idea stated above—the “slack-
ness” associated with an increase in the discount factor—induces the buyer to procure
with both higher investment and more suppliers.
39In the (ICb) we also account for the fact that when n = N the buyer optimally sets w
′ = β(n)π(n)).
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Since w is implicitly defined by (6), we can rewrite the buyer’s per-period objective
function as a function of the two main decision variables I and n,
H(I, n) ≡ v(I)− nI
δ
− θe(1)(n), (7)
where the actual cost of development (nI)/δ encompasses the cost of providing the n
suppliers with the incentives to invest (and clearly θe(1)(1) = θ
e(1)). For a given n, the





This condition shows that if δ increases and the optimal number of firms n∗B remains
unaffected, then the optimal level of investment increases.
Proposition 2 In the equilibrium optimal for the buyer, an increase of the discount
factor δ necessarily induces an increase of at least one of the two optimal procurement






B increase in δ if v(·) is sufficiently concave, that
is if the indirect effect is not too strong.
In the Theoretical Appendix below we prove the sufficient condition on the value of
investment v(·). Proposition 2 confirms that the general idea of the “slackness” induced
by a higher discount factor δ also pertains to the two optimal control variables for the




While these comparative static results contrast with the intuition that trust requires
an intimate relationship that is diminished by competition, they are clearly compatible
with our empirical findings that involve low-tech parts. In this case there are many
potential developers and the buyer has the bargaining power, hence the investment and
competition requested by the buyer in the procurement process both increase with trust.
In the Theoretical Appendix we show that our results qualitatively hold as long
as the buyer does not systematically open competition for production to all potential
suppliers (i.e. allowing for n ≤ ñ < N).41 We also show that the results of Proposition 2
carry over the case of multiple sourcing (Proposition 5) and that, consistently with our
40The optimal transfer w∗B is actually a residual variable determined by the binding constraint (6),
which shows that increases of both n∗B and I
∗
B tend to actually increase the transfer that the buyer has
to pay, if not sufficiently counterbalanced by the higher δ. Thus one cannot expect a clear relationship
between δ and w∗B .
41The case study evidence collected in 2005/06 for our industry shows that the blueprint submitted
by the typical supplier is very much conditioned by the technology available to him, technologies vary
across suppliers, and the winning supplier typically employs his technology. In this environment the
costs of adaptation can be very large, explaining why the relational contract that we expect to prevail is
the one studied in this section. Nevertheless, the production-adaptation expected cost E(k) significantly
differ between products, with more complex ones, like our “systems”, displaying considerably higher
costs than standardized ones, like our “commodities”. This seems to be indeed the case in our data as
we observe that the number of producers is larger than that of developers in 6.9% of the observations
regarding commodities, 3.7% for modules, and it is never the case for complex systems.
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findings (see Subsection 4.3), a larger δ induces the buyer to move from single-sourcing
to multiple sourcing.
5.3 Supplier’s bargaining power
We now identify the equilibrium procurement relational contract that is most profitable
for the leading supplier. More specifically, we characterize the equilibrium where n = 1,
while the buyer can still deviate and open the competition for the production contract
to the N suppliers. To motivate the assumption that n = 1, we have to realistically twist
our assumption that all N suppliers are ex ante symmetric. Especially when it comes
to systems and components as parts categories, the buyer typically has one favorite
supplier that is usually selected for the development of the part.42 We then discuss the
case n > 1.




[w + pe(1)− θe(1)− I] 1
1− δ
s.t. δ [v(I)− w − (v0 −Nβ(N)π(N))] + (1− δ)kN−1N ≥ p
e(1)− pe(N) (ICb)
w + pe(1)− θe(1) ≥ I/δ. (ICs)
(9)
Here the supplier specifies an investment level that generates an output revealed to be
valuable enough to the buyer, and towards that requires a transfer payment w from the
buyer. Notice that the (ICb) and (ICs) coincide with the ones in problem (5) above
when n = 1.
Here the supplier optimally increases w up to the point where the other side’s incen-
tive compatibility constraint (ICb) is binding, similarly to when the buyer has bargaining
power. Substituting this binding (ICb) constraint, the program PS becomes
max
I
[v(I)− I −K] 1
1− δ
s.t. v(I)−K ≥ I/δ. (ICs)
(10)
where








depends on N and δ but not on I.
We can now identify two alternative characterizations of the equilibrium relational
contract that is most profitable for the supplier. Denote by I∗ the first-best investment
defined by
v′(I∗) = 1. (12)
If the (ICs) constraint is satisfied at that investment level, then the relational contract
42A typical example was the selection of Bosch by Daimler –or that of Conti-Teves by BMW– to
develop ESP, the electronic stabilization program for their top models.
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is such that I∗S = I
∗. If instead the (ICs) constraint would be violated at the investment
level I∗, then the optimal investment I∗S is such that (ICs) binds:
v(I∗S)−K = I∗S/δ, (13)
and underinvestment occurs in equilibrium: I∗S < I
∗. Hence
Proposition 3 In the equilibrium optimal for the leading supplier, n∗S = 1, the optimal
investment is
(i) I∗S = I
∗ and an increase of the discount factor δ is not associated with any change
in the optimal level of investment I∗S;
(ii) I∗S < I
∗ and an increase of the discount factor δ necessarily induce an increase in
the equilibrium level of investment I∗S:
(iii) A large enough increase in k induces a switch from regime (ii) to regime (i).
When the supplier’s incentive constraint is binding, the investment level varies with
the discount factor. The reason is the buyer’s incentive constraint that may be binding
for low k. However, since K decreases in k, the incentive constraint is not necessarily
binding when k is large.
Hence this proposition provides us with an explanation of our empirical finding that
investment and competition do not increase with trust when high-tech parts are traded.
Although we have considered here the case with a single supplier, n = 1, and that
supplier’s optimal relational contract, the logic is the same when n > 1 suppliers have,
collectively, bargaining power. As above they would set w so that the buyer’s incentive
constraint (ICb) is binding and from this a result similar to Proposition 3 applies.
5.4 Switching-costs and bargaining power
With a careful description of the procurement process of parts by German car manufac-
turers, the two previous subsections allows us to draw the following inference: Whenever
we observe that the level of trust between suppliers and the buyer is positively correlated
with both the investment level in the development stage and the number of suppliers that
are involved in that stage, as with low-tech products, we conclude that the bargaining
power is in the hands of the buyer. If we instead observe that the level of trust between
suppliers and the buyer is related to neither the level of investment in the development
stage nor the number of suppliers involved in it, as with high-tech products, then the
bargaining power rests on the supply side.
The question then is why one should expect this different allocation of bargaining
power depending on high and low-tech products. This section provides a theoretical
argument in support of this observation and allocation of bargaining power for the two
product categories.
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The idea is that the the cost of switching to other suppliers for production, k in our
model, ultimately determines the party that has the bargaining power and becomes the
principal who designs the relational contract for the other party.
Suppose that prior to setting the relational contract for each individual part the
buyer and suppliers engage is a bidding game where the winner, that has the highest
payoff from becoming the principal, obtains the bargaining power. Formally, denote VB
and VS, respectively, the buyer’s and suppliers’ payoffs, associated with the solution to
problems PB and PS when that respective party has the bargaining power. We do not
explicitly model the bidding game but simply compare the parties’ optimal payoffs for
the different types of parts. In particular, we realistically assume that k, the cost to the
buyer of switching production to a non-developing supplier is low when associated with
low-tech, and high when associated with high-tech parts.
We thus compare VB(k) and VS(k) for different values of k.
Proposition 4 The buyer’s payoff of problem PB, VB(k), is weakly decreasing in k; the
suppliers’ payoffs of problem PS, VS(k), is strictly increasing in k.
For v0 sufficiently high, it exists a threshold value k̄ > 0 such that for k ≤ (≥)k̄ then
VB(k) ≥ (≤)VS(k).
The proposition shows that a high cost of switching to other suppliers, as with high-
tech parts, increases the payoff of the supplier and instead depresses that of the buyer.
(The opposite occurs when the switching cost k is low, as with low-tech parts.)
The intuition is that high k makes a buyer’s deviation (i.e. increasing the number of
producing suppliers) less profitable, so that a supplier with bargaining power needs to
promise a smaller compensation to the buyer, thus appropriating more surplus. When
instead the buyer has the bargaining power, a high k either has no effect, when the
incentive compatibility constraint of the buyer does not bind, or, if it instead binds,
then the buyer’s equilibrium payoff is exactly equal to her deviation payoff which is
obviously decreasing in k.
The second part of the proposition instead shows that the supports of the two func-
tions VB(k) and )VS(k) overlap whenever procurement is valuable, so that for low values
of k (respectively, high values) the buyer’s payoff is higher (lower) than that of the
supplier.
With this result we can conclude that when the switching cost to more supplier is low,
as with low-tech parts, the buyer has the bargaining power and in that case an increase
in δ is associated with an increase in both I∗B and n
∗
B, consistently with our empirical
finding when considering low-tech parts. Conversely, for high values of k the seller has
the bargaining power and in that case an increase in δ does not have a positive effect on
both I∗S and n
∗
S, once again consistently with our empirical findings when considering
high-tech parts.
By relating our equilibrium characterization to our empirical findings, we identified
a compelling explanation for a puzzling and rich empirical evidence. Not only relational
contracts are key in this important industry, we also show them adapting to the parties’
bargaining power, via the switching costs in production.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We analyse survey data providing unique evidence of the role of mixed formal and
relational contract arrangements in a high-tech industry in a developed country. We
observe substantial variation in trust across buyer-supplier relationships, caused by a
shock to the established procurement practices due to aggressive behavior of a major
industry participant.
We show that even within a stable functioning legal system, supply relationships
benefit from higher levels of trust with regard to investment and quality of parts. This
reflects the expectations from existing theory. Surprisingly, however, this association
is significant only for low-tech parts; we do not observe it for more complex high-tech
parts. Further, higher levels of trust are associated with buyers inducing more intense
competition between suppliers. Again, this relationship is significant only for low-tech,
but not for high-tech parts. Based on the evidence we provide, these results are driven
by the different levels of trust observed across the part-relationships in our data.
We rationalize our empirical findings within a theoretical model that contains el-
ements of formal and relational contracts. We show that, as long as the buyer has
the bargaining power and can push suppliers to their incentive constraint, an increase
in trust allows her to induce higher relationship-specific investment, and to increase
competition among suppliers in both the development and the production stage. The
bargaining power is tilted towards the leading supplier, however, when the provided
parts are complex and the cost of switching to a non-developing outside supplier is high.
Then the buyer can no longer leverage higher trust into increases of supplier investment,
or impose tougher competition among suppliers.
Based on our evidence, short-term oriented, opportunistic behavior diminishes trust
in relationships – with serious long-term consequences. By contrast, higher bilateral
trust significantly enhances the value that innovative suppliers provide to buyers in a
high-tech industry. Buyer-supplier relationships of this type are neither restricted to the
sector nor the country discussed here. And their importance is likely to further increase
with the upsurge of mechatronic devices and software solutions, as the products and
production facilities of classical industries become increasingly digital. Given that this
often involves cooperation with external innovative firms, our insights are highly relevant
in this context.
We show in particular that relationships between pairs of firms may differ substan-
tially at the level of individual parts procured. This indicates the importance and auton-
omy of individual procurement departments within corporations. Future research could
be devoted to better understand how part specific development, production, and market
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Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
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since π(1) = p(1)− E(θ). Clearly in this case we still have
∂I
∂δ







To identify the effect of an increase of δ on n in the case n = 1 we need to compare the
buyer objective function in the case n = 1 and n = 2. For a given level of investment I
(as contemplated in the proposition), once we substitute the binding (ICs) in the buyer’s
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Clearly, for given I, this condition is more likely to be satisfied the higher δ is.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Notice first that equation (8) implies that if δ increases, either n∗B or I
∗
B have to increase.
Consider next the overall effect of δ on both endogenous variables n∗B and I
∗
B. We proceed
in steps and start from the effect of δ on the optimal number of suppliers n∗B. Notice
that given some n at the optimal level of investment In defined in (8) above it could be
H(In, n)δ ≥ v0 δ + (1− δ)pe(n)− pe(N),
that is constraint (ICb) can never be satisfied even considering different values of I.
Clearly, in the steps of the proof we disregard these values of n and restrict attention
to (and explicitly consider only) those values of n that can allow to satisfy constraint
(ICb).
We first show that when comparing the buyer’s payoff associated with any two dif-
ferent numbers of suppliers n > ñ, there exists conditions on v(·) such that an increase
of the discount factor δ makes the buyer prefer procurement with a larger number n
rather than a smaller number ñ of suppliers. Recall that we are considering n > ñ which
implies I ñ ≥ In where In and I ñ are the associated optimal level of investments defined
















































[v′(I ñ)I ñ − v′(In)In]
46
and, using the Lagrange Residual of the Taylor series,
v′(I ñ)I ñ − v′(In)In = [v′′(ζ)ζ + v′(ζ)] (I ñ − In)
where ζ = (1 − θ)I ñ + θIn. If v′′(·) is sufficiently negative the r.h.s. is negative which
proves our claim.
Consider now the effect of δ on the optimal investment I∗B. If n
∗
B were a continuous
variable, then equation (8) above immediately would imply that whenever an increase
of δ induces a larger n∗B then I
∗
B might decrease. However, when n changes with unitary
increments and δ is in the [0, 1] range, the r.h.s. of (8) must increase when n∗B increases.
In other words, if the increase of δ is not large enough to affect n∗B, then necessarily
I∗B must increase with δ. Increases of the discount factor δ are associated with possibly
infrequent and (relatively) small reductions of I∗B when n
∗
B “jumps up”and more frequent
and (relatively) large increases I∗B when n
∗
B remains constant. This follows from the
observation that, for the same change ∆δ of δ, the (absolute value of the) change of the
r.h.s. in (8) is smaller when n∗B increases than when it remains constant.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
The supplier’s problem (10) in Subsection 5.3 above can be rewritten as
max
I
[v(I)− I −K] 1
1−δ
s.t. [v(I)− I −K] 1











Given the definition of I∗ in (12) above we can distinguish two possible cases. The




−K] ≥ 0, (16)
in which case I∗S = I
∗ and an increase of the discount factor δ is not associated with any
change in the optimal level of investment I∗S.




−K] < 0. (17)




−K] = 0. (18)
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Consider first the numerator of (19). Clearly a necessary condition for the buyer to
consider a deviation at t4 that opens the auction to ñ = N sellers is that the expected
reduction in the price due to opening the auction, p(1) − pe(N), exceeds the expected
cost of asking one of the (N − 1) sellers that did not participate in the development
stage to produce the commissioned part, k(N − 1)/N , that is[




In the other case the (ICb) constraint would not be binding.
Consider now the denominator of (19). We need to identify the sign of [v′(IS)−(1/δ)].





that is the value of I that maximises the function [v(IS)− (IS/δ)]. Notice also that the





has two solutions whenever IS 6= Î. Denote these solutions IS,1, IS,2 with IS,1 < Î < IS,2.
The seller will choose the investment I∗S = IS,i, i ∈ {1, 2} that maximises [v(I∗S)− I∗S].
We can then conclude that necessarily
IS,2 < I
∗. (20)
Assume by way of contradiction that this is not the case, that is IS,2 > I
∗. Since the





















while from the definition of I∗ we have that
[v(I∗)− I∗] > [v(IS,2)− I2S]
or
[v(IS,2)− v(I∗)] < [IS,2 − I∗].. (22)
Inequalities (21) and (22) then imply








which if IS,2 > I
∗ contradicts δ < 1.
We therefore conclude from the definition of I∗, the fact that IS,1 < IS,2 < I
∗ and
the strict concavity of v(·) that the seller will choose I∗S = IS,2. Since Î < IS,2 and v′(·)





















This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider first the situation where the bargaining power rests with the buyer. Using the





s.t. H(I, n) 1





{pe(n)− pe(N)− k[1− nβ(N)]}
(23)
where H(0, N) = v0 − Nw′ − pe(N) is the per period payoff of procuring with all N




Then as discussed in Subsection 5.2 above there are two possible cases. The first case is










{pe(n∗)− pe(N)− k[1− n∗β(N)]}
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then the value function of the program VB(k) = H(I
∗, n∗) 1
1−δ does not depend on k.










{pe(n∗)− pe(N)− k[1− n∗β(N)]}
and then at the optimum (ICb) binds and the value function VB(k) is






{pe(n∗S(k))− pe(N)− k[1− n∗S(k)β(N)]}.
Recall that n∗B(k) is the optimal choice of n in problem (23). Therefore by Envelope
Theorem the effect of an increase in k is to reduce VB(k) since 1− nβ(N) ≥ 0. In other
words, if the buyer has the bargaining power, then VB(k) is weakly decreasing in k.
Consider now the case where the bargaining power rests with the supplier. In line
with Subsection 5.3 above, we focus only on the specific case n∗S = 1.
Using (10) we have that
VS(k) = max
I
[v(I)− I −K(k)] 1
1− δ
s.t. v(I)−K(k) ≥ I/δ.
(24)
where








As we have seen above there are two possible cases. The first case where (ICs) does
not bind at the optimum, then the investment is at the first best level I∗S = I
∗ and the
value function of the program VS(k) is (directly) increasing in k since clearly K(k) is
decreasing in k. The second case where the (ICs) constraint binds, then substituting




that allows us to conclude, by Envelope Theorem, that VS(k) is also increasing in k.
Finally, notice from problem (24) and (23) above that the lower is k the more likely
is the case that both (ICs) and (ICb) are binding.
Now we show that for v0 sufficiently high the the two functions VB(k), VS(k) have
overlapping supports. When k = 0 the (ICs) constraint is:
v(I)− I
δ




Recall now that I∗ is the first-best investment
v′(I∗) = 1.
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Therefore, substituting in the seller’s problem above we have that in the case k = 0
when v0 ≥ v̂s0
VS(0) = v(I




Consider now the case in which the buyer has the bargaining power, problem (23)
above. The (ICb) constraint can be written as:
v(I)− nI
δ




pe(n)− pe(N)− kN − n
N
]
Therefore when k = 0 the (ICb) constraint becomes:
v(I)− nI
δ




Denote now Îb to be the investment level that maximizes with respect to I the













then necessarily the (ICb) has to bind at k = 0 or
v(I)− nI
δ













Therefore, substituting in the buyer’s problem above we have that in the case k = 0
when v0 ≥ v̂b0,




Therefore, for values of v0 ≥ max{vs0, vb0} we have that a large enough v0 guarantees:
VB(0) > VS(0)
that is
v0 −Nw′ − pe(N) +
1− δ
δ


















Consider now the values of VS(k) and VB(k) for k sufficiently large. Notice first that
in supplier’s problem, when the investment equals to the first-best level I = I∗ for k








pe(1)− pe(N)− (1− δ)kN − 1
N
]
Similarly, in the buyer’s problem above, when investment equals the value that maxi-













Therefore, for k large enough so that constraint (ICs) in the seller’s bargaining power
problem and (ICb) in the buyer’s bargaining power problem are not binding, we have:
VS(k) =
{




















It follows that there exists a value of k, denoted k such that:











Hence, for any k > k we have
VS(k) > VB(k). (35)
Summarizing, we have shown that when v0 ≥ max{vs0, vb0}, for k sufficiently small
then VB(k) > VS(k), while for larger k we have VB(k) < VS(k), which concludes what
we wanted to prove.
Incidentally, we observe that for low-tech products we expect the value of procure-
ment with nil investment, that is v0, to be relatively high, thus leading to the previous
case where VB(k) and VS(k) have overlapping ranges. For high-tech products, instead,




Suppliers’ Market Power (n > 1)
Consider the case where a group of n > 1 suppliers approach the buyer for procurement
and propose a level of investment I in exchange of an ex-ante payments w. When it
comes to production the buyer has the possibility to exploit the best blueprint procured
by the n suppliers and run an auction with more, possibly all N suppliers that identifies
an (expected) price pe(N). As with n = 1 the suppliers will optimally set w so that the




[v(I)− (v0 −Nw′)] +
1
δn





We focus here on the case in which the (ICs) constraint does not bind. Substituting
(36) in the suppliers’ expected-discounted profit, the optimal level of investment I∗ must
satisfy the following condition
v′(I∗) = n. (37)
This clearly shows that if, when δ changes, the number of suppliers n does not
change, as we observe in the data for high-tech products, then the I∗ does not change
either. This is clearly different from the case where the buyer has the bargaining power
because, see Proposition 2 above, there we see that if n does not change, then necessarily
an increase of δ must induce an increase in I∗. It is also immediate to see from (37)
above that n and I∗ are negatively related being v(·) a strictly concave function.
Bundling Development and Production
The relational contract that we have considered in the main text contemplates bundling
development and production and is motivated by the evidence in our industry. Substi-








The buyer and the suppliers may in principle agree to rely on a different relational
contract where n′ ≥ 1 suppliers develop n′ possibly different blueprints and competition
for production involves all the N suppliers. Such type of procurement would allow to
minimize the cost of production but would involve incurring the adjustment cost k.
Considering that the N−n′ suppliers excluded from development would be requested
to pay an ex-ante participation fee w′, similarly as to w for those developing, the buyer’s
objective function can be written as,[
v(I ′)− n′ I
′
δ





where the expected cost of adjustment E(k) is multiplied by the probability (1−n′β(N))
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that the producing most efficient supplier did not develop its blueprint.43 Maximizing
this objective with respect to n′ the buyer faces a trade-off. On one hand fewer developing
suppliers (that is lower n′) avoid the duplication of investment costs (the second term in
the parenthesis). On the other hand, this increases the probability of facing adjustment
costs. As it can be seen, this trade-off (and the associated one on the optimal choice
of I), is similar to that with bundling. Here the fewer developing suppliers imply a
higher adjustment cost E(k)β(N), with bundling they imply a higher production cost
θe(1)(n). Hence, whether at the optimum the buyer employs more or less suppliers at the
developing stage with unbundling also depends on these different costs.
Considering that the two relational contracts may be associated with different levels


















The left hand side indicates the production-adjustment cost of unbundling. The two
terms in the right hand side reflect the fact that two relational contracts may be asso-
ciated with different levels of investment. Even if this is not the case, employing fewer
developing firms allows the buyer to save on duplication costs here captured by the sec-
ond terms in each parenthesis. What matter to our purposes, however, is that if E(k)
is large, then condition (38) implies the buyer prefers to bundle development and the
possibility to produce.
Notice that the cost of developing a blueprint is unrelated to the cost of developing
a production technology based on a particular blueprint, including specific labor skills
and expensive tools. The adjustment costs k may therefore be substantially higher than
those of developing the blueprint. For example, the development cost for a front end
module may be very small compared to the adjustment cost of producing it. Also, besides
the cost of instructing the producing firm to use another firm’s blueprint and to delay
production to do so, the adjustment cost k may include as well the cost of managing
the free riding problem and the conflicting incentives of the developer and the producer
under unbundling. For example, when a firm i wins the production contract but did
not develop the blueprint used for production, he can claim that ensuing problems with
production follow from poor blueprint design rather than little care in adapting it in
production.
Finally, two further considerations are in order. First, a relational contract may in
principle condition the intensity of competition on the realization of k. However, this
possibility is precluded by the fact that, realistically, only the buyer has a clear idea of
the effective realization of the adjustment cost k that she will have to bear. Second, for
some products the expected adjustment cost E(k) may not be very high, and the buyer
and the sellers may agree on a relational contract that explicitly relies on a number of
43We are not allowing the relational contract to be conditioned on the ex post realization of k because
adjustment costs are typically private information of the parties, which would make the relational
contract unrealistically complex.
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competing suppliers at production ñ larger than n, that at the investment stage, e.g. in
a ratio two to one. Although the model would be different from the one studied here,
the main results would qualitatively hold in this case too, as long as ñ < N . In this case
in fact, we can identify conditions such that an increase in δ may now reflect into higher
investment, larger n and ñ. The latter case is further discussed in the next appendix on
multiple sourcing.
More suppliers in series production (multiple sourcing)
The management literature regards “supply assurance” as a crucial motive behind
multiple-sourcing, that is, simultaneously procuring an input from different suppliers.
The buyer hedges against the risk that her assembly line is brought to an expensive halt
because the single supplier is not forthcoming with the parts at the right time or in the
required quantity.44 On the other hand, Riordan and Sappington (1989) and Rogerson
(1989) stressed early on that, by reducing suppliers’ production rents, second sourcing
may undermine incentives for R&D.
In our environment, an adverse event (observable) may take place with probability
α, in which case the unique supplier would be able to procure just a fraction 1−γ of the
required production. Facing this risk of incomplete procurement—the costs of which we
do not explicitly model, for simplicity—dual-sourcing and two production contracts may
be preferable to single-sourcing. The first-source contract exhausts the entire production
with probability 1 − α. With complementary probability α the adverse event realizes
and the first-source contract will only provide the fraction 1 − γ of production. The
second-source contract, under which the complementary fraction γ is supplied, will be
executed in this case.
We mainly focus here on the case where the buyer designs the procurement contract.
Since the buyer will never allocate the two contracts to the same supplier, dual-sourcing
corresponds here to a multi-unit auction where firms are not allowed to win both con-
tracts and are thus interested in winning just one of the two. With at least three
competing suppliers, the buyer’s selection mechanism is assumed to be a uniform-price
auction (which is efficient here and involves truthful bidding).
With dual-sourcing the buyer pays more for production, since the price paid to the
two winners of the first- and second-source contracts is the production cost θe(3)(n) of
the third- rather than the second-most efficient firm as in the case of single sourcing
(Section 5.2). Yet dual-sourcing almost surely guarantees complete production even in
the case the adverse event is realized. The higher price paid by the buyer translates into
higher expected information rents to suppliers. To see this, note that from the analysis
above the expected rent with single-sourcing is β(n)π(n)(1− αγ). With dual-sourcing,
it is instead
β(n)π1(n)(1− αγ) + β̃(n)π2(n)αγ
where β(n) and β̃(n) are respectively the probabilities of being the most efficient and
the second-most efficient supplier—both equal to (1/n)—with associated rents π1(n)
44See Yu et al. (2009) or Wang et al. (2010).
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and π2(n).
45 Since π1(n) ≥ π(n), dual-sourcing guarantees a larger expected rent to
suppliers. With an argument similar to that in Section 5.2, we obtain:
Proposition 5 Assume the function v(·) is sufficiently concave. If δ has an effect on
the type of procurement, then an increase in δ induces the buyer to switch from single-
sourcing to dual-sourcing.
Proof: From the binding suppliers’ incentive compatibility constraint, as in (2), and
coherently with w being paid ex ante with respect to production, whether a producer
delivers full production or not, we obtain an equivalent optimal procurement program










− (1− αγ)θe(1)(n∗d)− αγθe(2)(n∗d).
We now compare dual-sourcing to single-sourcing, when the buyer has the bargaining
power. The latter being now associated with a buyer’s expected (per-period) payoff:
H(I∗B, n
∗




where, as above, I∗B denotes the optimal investment under single-sourcing and the buyer
has the bargaining power and n∗B the number of developers.
To make the analysis interesting so that a change δ can have an impact on the type
of sourcing, we assume that (i) if the buyer can only procure nil investment, as when
δ = 0, then it is optimal to procure with single-sourcing, which formally requires





(ii) if investment is perfectly contractible, as when δ = 1, then it is optimal to procure
with dual sourcing, which formally requires:
Hd(Îd, n̂d) = v(Îd)− n̂dÎd − (1− αγ)θe(1)(n̂d)− αγθe(2)(n̂d) >
> H(Î , n̂) = (1− αγ)v(Î)− n̂Î − (1− αγ)θe(1)(n̂)
where the variables n̂ and Î are the optimal choices with contractibility. When n̂d =










45To simplify notation we assume that a firm i that procures a fraction of total (unitary) production
faces a production cost which is the corresponding fraction of its cost θi. Then we have π1(n) =
θe(3) (n)− θ
e






where the first square bracket is positive and the condition is then implied by:
v(Î) > θe(2)(ñ).
These two assumptions are consistent with the facts that if procured investment is nil,
the value of complete procurement is relatively low and the buyer is ready to minimize
its cost with single-sourcing. On the other hand, when the buyer wants to procure a very
large investment, then risking incomplete procurement is very costly and dual-sourcing
should be optimal.
Now notice first that if the investment is the same I∗B = I
∗
d = Î, for any given δ the
buyer, when indifferent between single- and dual-sourcing, will choose a larger number
of developing firms under dual-sourcing than under single-sourcing. In other words:
Hd(Î , n
∗







With dual-sourcing, the buyer can leverage on the larger expected rent for suppliers,
thus affording more competing firms. Notice also that for any given δ and equal number
of developing firms n∗d = n
∗
B = n̂, the optimal target investment under dual- and single-













Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2, it now follows immediately
that for any given δ if the function v(·) is sufficiently concave when the buyer is indifferent

















Moreover, the envelope theorem implies that, as in Subsection 5.2 above, the effects






















, and since Hd(0, N) < H(0, N) and Hd(Îd, n̂d) >
H(Î , n̂), by continuity there is a threshold for δ such that H = Hd. We can then
conclude that when the function v(·) is sufficiently concave, if δ increases the buyer
moves from optimally choosing single-sourcing to choosing dual-sourcing: dual-sourcing
is more likely the higher is the level of δ. This concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
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Although the thresholds for concavity of Proposition 5 and of Proposition 2 are not
the same, the result is based on a similar mechanism. First, dual-sourcing guarantees a
larger rent to suppliers than single-sourcing. Hence, as in the model in the main test, the
“slackness” in suppliers’ incentive compatibility translates into a larger optimal number
of developing suppliers n∗d and higher investment I
∗
d (d denotes dual-sourcing) compared
with single-sourcing, if the function v(·) is sufficiently concave. Second, the higher
investment and larger number of suppliers imply that the actual cost of development
with dual-sourcing (n∗dI
∗
d)/δ is higher than that with single-sourcing. This finally implies
that an increase of δ benefits the buyer (in reducing the actual cost of development) more
with dual-sourcing than with single-sourcing, so that if a larger δ has an effect at all, it
induces the buyer to move from single-sourcing to dual-sourcing.
When procurement design is in the hands of suppliers, dual-sourcing seems less rel-
evant and natural. If the buyer’s value significantly reduces in case of production halt,
a “main” supplier with bargaining power may involve one (or more) additional supplier
with the type of step-in contract described above. This sub-contract would allow to
increase the buyer’s expected value, which the main supplier can then extract. At the
same time, the difficulty is that, in addition to his own incentives, the main supplier
must also guarantee the sub-contractors’ incentive compatibility constraints with appro-
priate transfers. The optimality of subcontracting very much depends on this subtle
comparison and, what is more for our purposes, the effect of a larger δ is ambiguous.
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Supplementary Tables




supplier revenues (bln) -.001 -.001
(.621) (.711)
# suppliers overall .001 .001
(.477) (.452)
product type
system (D) reference category
module (D) -.018 -.017
(.866) (.875)
component (D) -.183* -.192**
(.063) (.046)
commodity (D) -.186** -.195**
(.045) (.039)
Buyer-FE (11) no yes
# observations 107 107
The table reports regression results for the following dependent variable: Frequency of quality problems arising (in
percent) – average marginal effects and (p-values) reported; standard errors are clustered at the level of buyer-seller
pairs; trustPD measures the supplier’s trust in the buyer in the context of initiating pre-development * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 12: Robustness: Directed trust and quality issues (proxy for investment): Frac-
tional probit results
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Variables Trust Index (normalized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPR Conflicts PD -0.420**
(0.170)




IPR Conflicts DEV -0.292***
(0.0869)




supplier revenues (bln) -0.003 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.008*
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
# suppliers overall -0.006 -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 0.003 -0.005
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
product type
system (D) reference category
module (D) -0.050 0.142 0.145 0.082 -0.011 0.171
(0.434) (0.213) (0.237) (0.319) (0.284) (0.210)
component (D) 0.353 0.323* 0.402** 0.253 0.131 0.170
(0.306) (0.192) (0.201) (0.268) (0.237) (0.189)
commodity (D) 0.078 0.061 0.294 -0.049 -0.017 0.154
(0.310) (0.224) (0.242) (0.282) (0.253) (0.201)
const 0.072 0.208 -1.366 0.122 4.973 5.059
(0.344) (0.288) (0.278) (0.316) (0.261) (0.218)
Observations 121 240 220 179 159 193
R-squared 0.091 0.134 0.066 0.069 0.068 0.093
Dependent variable: Normalized trust index. Coefficients and (p-values) reported. Robust standard errors clustered at level of
buyer-seller pairs. PD = Pre-development; DEV = Development; * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.
Table 13: Determinants of the Normalized Trust Index: OLS regressions
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Frequency of Quality Problems
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
trust index (n) -.014 -.024** -.267** -.037** -.010
(.250) (.038) (.041) (0.014) (0.715)
supplier revenues (bln) -.001 -.002 omitted omitted omitted
(.352) (.253)
# suppliers overall .001 .001 -.002 -.002 -.002
(.390) (.418) (0.321) (.135) (0.235)
product type
system (D) reference category
module (D) -.032 -.042 -.087 .018 -0.007
(.683) (.593) (.205) (.823) (0.944)
component (D) -.165** -.175** -.076 .053 .027
(.020) (.013) (.212) (.626) (0.757)
commodity (D) -.181*** -.189*** -.084 -.005 -.020
(.007) (.006) (.123) (.819) (0.780)
Buyer-FE (11) no yes yes yes yes
Supplier-FE (13) no no yes yes yes
Buyer-Part-FE no no no yes no
Buyer-Supplier-FE no no no no yes
# observations 127 127 127 127 127
The table reports fractional probit regression results for the following dependent variable: Frequency of quality
problems arising (in percent). Avg. marginal effects and (p-values) reported. Trust index (n) is the alternative
normalized trust index using the differences in importance between trust and price. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the level of buyer-seller pairs. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of suppliers at different stages
Variables Pre-Dev.♠ Dev.♣ Ser. Prod.♥
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
trust index (n) -.042 -.032 .059* .103* .115*** .128***
(.195) (.429) (.066) (.052) (.007) (.007)
supplier revenues .002 .004 .024*** .027*** .005 .006
(.588) (.240) (.000) (.000) (.260) (.122)
product type
system (D) reference category
module (D) -.080 -.003 .707** .775*** 0.139 0.207
(.629) (.429) (.023) (.003) (.424) (.193)
component (D) 0̇04 .018 .292 .313 .135 .151
(.979) (.913) (.265) (.225) (.428) (.307)
commodity (D) .106 .116 .564** .584** .443** .484***
(.448) (.433) (.018) (.011) (.015) (.001)
const .689 .426 -.271 -.509 -.053 -.275
(.000) (.031) (.337) (.088) (.785) (.116)
Buyer-FE (11) no yes no yes no yes
# observations 78 78 127 127 126 126
Pseudo-R2 .005 .013 .036 .055 .025 .035
The table reports Poisson regression results for the following dependent variables: ♠ Number of suppliers employed
during pre-development – coefficients and (p- values) reported – ♣ number of suppliers during the final stage of devel-
opment – coefficients and (p-values) reported – ♥ number of suppliers at the start of series production – coefficients
and (p-values) reported; robust standard errors are clustered at the level of buyer-seller pairs. Trust index (n) is the
alternative normalized trust index using the differences in importance between trust and price. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 16: Robustness: Normalized trust index and competition: Poisson-regression
results
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